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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 We first noticed a possible “gender gap” in attorney discipline 
when we ran across the Oklahoma Disciplinary Commission’s annual 
report for the year 2000.1 Women currently constitute 27% of Okla-
homa attorneys, but 0% of the disciplined attorneys—none of the 
seventeen named—were women.2 Wondering whether the Oklahoma 
figures were aberrational, we attempted to locate research concern-
ing gender and attorney discipline. But there have been few such 
studies,3 although “[p]robably no issue in the social sciences receives 
more attention than the difference between men and women.”4 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Annual Report of the Professional Responsibility Commission and Professional Re-
sponsibility Tribunal, January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2000, 72 OKLA. B.J. 726 
(2001) [hereinafter Oklahoma 2000 Report]. 
 2. Gary C. Clark, Diversity of the Oklahoma Bar Association, 73 OKLA. B.J. 2227 
(2002). Of active Oklahoma attorneys in 2002, 25.43% are female. R. Darcy & Mark 
Payton, 2002 Oklahoma Bar Association Membership Survey Report, 73 OKLA. B.J. 3395, 
3402 (2002). 
 3. Three notable studies of gender and attorney ethics, but not disciplinary matters, 
are RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE 
CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989); Sandra Janoff, The Influence of 
Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193 (1991), discussed infra Part 
IV.H.4.; and Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An 
Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (1988).  
To our knowledge, there are also no published empirical studies of gender and legal mal-
practice, despite one scholar’s assertion that “[l]egal malpractice . . . is . . ., by far, the pre-
dominant way in which lawyers are regulated.” Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Re-
forming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2601 (1996) (footnotes omit-
ted); cf. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 21 (2000) (noting 
that “availability of statistics on current [malpractice] claims frequency and severity is 
scarce”). Despite an extensive study of legal malpractice claims in the late 1990s, the 
American Bar Association did not study any differences in rates of such claims by attorney 
gender. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF. LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 1996-1999 (2001) [hereinafter ABA MALPRACTICE PROFILE] (study-
2004]                ARE WOMEN MORE ETHICAL LAWYERS? 787 
 
 We thus embarked upon a national study of disciplinary actions 
decided in 2000. After collecting, coding, and analyzing about 3500 
publicly available cases from all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia,5 we conclude that female attorneys are, in fact, disciplined at 
a significantly lower rate than male attorneys, relative to their re-
spective proportions in the United States attorney population.  
 This Article presents the primary statistical findings of our study 
of gender differences in attorney discipline. We examined, with re-
spect to male and female attorneys, the overall rates of discipline im-
posed, the frequency with which different types of sanctions (such as 
disbarment and suspension) were imposed, the frequency with which 
male and female attorneys committed different types of ethical viola-
tions (such as incompetence or failure to communicate with clients), 
and other potentially relevant differences. Through regression analy-
sis, we also attempted to discover if gender was a significant predic-
tor of the severity of a sanction.  
 Part II describes the methodology used to collect, code, and ana-
lyze the observations included in our database. Part III presents the 
results of our statistical analysis. Part IV discusses, necessarily 
speculatively, possible factors contributing to the gender differences 
that were found in the study, with attention to other empirical stud-
ies of gender and moral reasoning.  
II.   METHODOLOGY 
A.   How Does One Measure “Ethical” Attorney Conduct? 
 In this study, we use the absence of an adverse disciplinary action 
taken against an attorney as the most convenient proxy for “ethical” 
attorney behavior. To be sure, avoiding the violation of attorney dis-
ciplinary rules (or more specifically, avoiding being punished for the 
violation) is probably the minimum ethical standard an attorney can 
uphold.6 Nonetheless, the presence or absence of a finding of a disci-
plinary violation is an objective and available measure of attorney 
ethics.  
                                                                                                                      
ing the number of legal malpractice claims by area of law, number of attorneys in firm, 
type of activity, disposition of claim, type of alleged error, expense paid, indemnity dollars 
paid to claimant—but not by gender of attorney). 
 4. Mike Allen, Methodological Considerations When Examining a Gendered World, 
in SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN COMMUNICATION: CRITICAL ESSAYS AND EMPIRI-
CAL INVESTIGATIONS OF SEX AND GENDER IN INTERACTION 427 (Daniel J. Canary & Kath-
ryn Dindia eds., 1998) [hereinafter SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES]. 
 5. The code book is available on request from the authors. 
 6. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 78 (1994) (noting that “for-
mal codes of ethics never aimed at capturing the entire ensemble of understandings that 
lawyers observe in their dealings with one another, with clients, and with the courts”). 
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 Of course, professional standards of attorney conduct are impli-
cated in enforcement models other than disciplinary actions.7 How-
ever, we have limited our proxy for unethical attorney behavior to 
disciplinary actions that are proceedings, usually conducted by a 
state’s lawyer disciplinary agency before the state’s highest court, 
“outside the scope of any civil or criminal case” that may have inci-
dentally given rise to the disciplinary claim.8 
B.   The Sample of Disciplined Attorneys 
 The sample9 for our study consisted of all attorney disciplinary 
cases that actually resulted in some kind of adverse sanction in cal-
endar year 2000. Thus, cases that were merely initiated or pending 
in 2000, rulings on petitions for reinstatement to the bar (whether 
grants or denials), and findings of no violation (which are very rare 
in publicly available disciplinary reports) were not included in the 
database. We also necessarily confined our study to disciplinary ac-
tions for which public information was available, since the vast ma-
jority of states keep private disciplinary actions confidential.10 Fur-
thermore, at the time we began our inquiry, calendar year 2000 was 
                                                                                                                      
 7. E.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 
805-09 (1992) (describing four basic models of enforcement of professional standards of 
conduct for attorneys: disciplinary, liability (malpractice), institutional, and legislative). A 
normative discussion of the most effective system of attorney regulation, see, e.g., Ramos, 
supra note 3 (advocating legal malpractice claims as the most effective system), is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 8. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Con-
duct: Achieving Reciprocal Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. REV. 303, 304-05 (1996) (distinguishing 
between independent disciplinary actions and “proceeding[s] on lawyer misconduct within 
a traditional civil or criminal case”). 
 9. Technically this was a “sample” of the population of all attorney discipline cases, 
although we endeavored to find the “population” of publicly-available discipline cases de-
cided in 2000. See, e.g., DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 333 (3d ed. 1991) (defining 
population as a whole class of individuals and sample as part of a population). 
 10. Oregon is the only state in which disciplinary proceedings are a matter of public 
record from the time the initial complaint is filed. See, e.g., Jill Hertz Blaustein, Attorney 
Disciplinary Actions: How Public Should They Be?, LITIG. NEWS, Sept. 2001, at 3 (noting 
that Oregon maintains open files from the time a disciplinary case is filed); ABA COMM’N 
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES at 
iv, vi (1991) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT] (honoring co-chair Robert B. McKay and noting 
also that Florida’s and West Virginia’s disciplinary records are public “when a charge is 
filed or a complaint is dismissed,” and recommending that “[a]ll disciplinary records except 
disciplinary counsels’ work product should be public from the time a complaint is made 
unless a protective order is granted”); cf. Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Discipli-
nary Process–1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for 
Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 961 (1994) (In Ohio, “the identity of the grievant, the at-
torney complained of, the nature of the complaint, and the resolution of the complaints are 
veiled in secrecy.”). Thus, one has greater access to disciplinary information about a spe-
cific attorney in Oregon, if one asked about the attorney by name, but Oregon’s annual 
compilation of disciplinary cases includes only those cases in which discipline has been or-
dered. See, e.g., OR. STATE BAR, DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL’S OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 
15 & app. D (2001) [hereinafter OREGON 2000 REPORT] (copy on file with author). 
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the latest full year for which attorney disciplinary information was 
publicly available.11  
 We also did not include in the database interim suspensions that 
were due solely to an attorney’s failure to pay dues (or an assessment 
for client security funds)12 or to comply with continuing legal educa-
tion requirements, primarily because not all states report these sus-
pensions publicly. However, interim suspensions on the grounds of a 
criminal conviction or an affidavit from bar counsel that, for exam-
ple, “the lawyer’s continuing conduct is causing, or is likely to cause, 
immediate and serious injury to a client or to the public,”13 were in-
cluded.14 Finally, we did not include judicial discipline or specialized 
proceedings involving the unauthorized practice of law, on the as-
sumption that these proceedings do not usually involve practicing at-
torneys. 
C.   Collecting the Data 
1.   Reports of Disciplinary Actions 
 Collecting the data for the chosen year proved much more time-
consuming and difficult than we originally expected.15 Surprisingly, 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Indeed, several states did not have final disciplinary reports on the year 2000 un-
til late in 2001. E.g., SUPREME COURT OF S.C. COMM’N ON LAWYER CONDUCT, ANNUAL RE-
PORT FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 2000 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2001 (2001) (on file with author) 
(amended Oct. 4, 2001). 
 12. In Alabama, for example, attorneys may be required to pay an annual fee of $25 to 
fund the Client Security Fund, Ala. State Bar Security Fund Rules, and may be interimly 
suspended for non-payment. ALA. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 8(a), 9(a). 
 13. E.g., ALA. R. OF DISCIPLINARY P. 20(a). 
 14. However, if such an interim suspension was followed by final disposition in the 
same year (such as a resignation), only the final sanction, not the interim suspension, was 
counted. 
 15. The lack of readily available statistics on lawyer discipline appears to be a source 
of wonderment to many of us. See, e.g., Bruce A. Campbell & Ruth A. Kollman, The Lady 
or the Tiger? Opening the Door to Lawyer Discipline Standards, 1 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 231, 
232 (1999) (describing their attempt to review discipline imposed on Texas lawyers during 
1998 as “a bit of a shock” because, among other reasons, “the data is not maintained in a 
consistent manner, making it difficult to compile”); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes 
and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (noting difficulty in obtaining “a clear picture of the consistency, efficacy 
or fairness” of lawyer sanctions); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional 
Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 558 (1985) (“[E]mpirical evidence on lawyers’ ethics is frag-
mentary.”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
721, 743 (2001) (“Surprisingly, . . . not a single statistical compilation has ever been pub-
lished that collects information governing the discipline of prosecutors or that compares 
the discipline of prosecutors to the discipline of private practitioners.”). But see COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, WORKING PAPERS, SPECIAL STUDIES OF FEDERAL RULES 
GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1997) (contain-
ing several compilations of the types of attorney disciplinary violations committed in fed-
eral courts, but not including any information on attorney gender). 
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there is no mandatory national repository of such information at the 
level of detail we needed to conduct this study.16 
 Thus, we had to gather the data state-by-state.17 Throughout 
2001, we contacted the offices of disciplinary counsel in all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia by letter, telephone, and e-mail, re-
questing the annual report of the agency, if any, and other available 
information on disciplined attorneys for the year 2000.18 We believe 
we received annual disciplinary reports for 2000 (or some equivalent 
fiscal year followed by the state) from all states that issue such a re-
port.  
 We discovered great variation from state to state in the quality 
and accessibility of publicly available information on attorney disci-
plinary actions. Although record-keeping has come a long way since 
an ABA commission lambasted disciplinary agencies in 1970,19 we do 
not have perfect confidence that we were able to locate complete re-
                                                                                                                      
 16. The American Bar Association’s Center for Professional Responsibility occasion-
ally publishes survey data it receives from state lawyer disciplinary agencies. ABA, CTR. 
FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, STANDING COMM. ON PROF. DISCIPLINE, 1998-99 SURVEY ON 
LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2001) [hereinafter 1998-99 SURVEY]; ABA, CTR. FOR PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, STANDING COMM. ON PROF. DISCIPLINE, 1996 SURVEY ON LAWYER DIS-
CIPLINE SYSTEMS (1998) [hereinafter 1996 SURVEY]. These surveys were of limited use for 
this Article, primarily because no information on attorney gender is requested or reported, 
but also because the provision of information is voluntary (eleven states did not respond in 
1996 and five states did not respond in 1998-1999), and the information sought is aggrega-
tive in nature, revealing nothing of the circumstances of individual cases. 
 The Center for Professional Responsibility also maintains the National Lawyer Regula-
tory Data Bank, a voluntary compilation of disciplinary records for states and some federal 
courts. Individual reports on a given state in a given year can be purchased from the Cen-
ter ($30 per state per year for ABA members). See ABA Center for Professional Responsi-
bility, National Lawyer Regulatory Databank, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/databank.html 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004). However, the reports list only the name of the attorney disci-
plined and the final disposition. No other pertinent information, such as the attorney’s 
gender (except for what can be gleaned from the first name), what the attorney did that 
was unethical, the type of case, the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, or the 
age of the attorney, is provided. Due to these content limitations, as well as the authors’ 
funding limitations, the only state for which we purchased a report was Connecticut. The 
report contains this disclaimer: “Because of the voluntary nature of this service, the Data 
Bank makes no claim that its records represent every public regulatory action taken and 
reinstatement issued.” ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 2000 CONN. LAWYER 
REGULATORY REPORT 1 (2000) (on file with author). The limited nature of the data kept by 
the Center for Professional Responsibility is understandable in light of the purpose for 
which the Data Bank was instituted: to improve interstate enforcement of disciplinary vio-
lations by attorneys licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction. See MCKAY REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 59-60. 
 17. A comprehensive list of all sources used in compiling the cases that went into the 
database is available on request from the authors. 
 18. The ABA maintains a Directory of Lawyer Disciplinary Agencies on its web site. 
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Directory of Lawyer Disciplinary Agencies, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cprd/disciplinary.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 19. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 87 (1970) [hereinafter CLARK 
REPORT] (honoring the commission’s chair, retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark 
and decrying inadequate record-keeping by many disciplinary agencies). 
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cords for some of the states.20 Some states’ disciplinary counsel pre-
pare comprehensive compilations of all attorney disciplinary actions 
in the state for the period in question, listing the attorney’s name, of-
fenses committed, year of admission to the bar, case disposition, and 
other pertinent information.21 A few states have comprehensive lists 
of disciplined attorneys on their web sites.22 Other states’ disciplinary 
counsel issue reports giving only aggregate numbers from which no 
information about individual cases can be gleaned.23 Some states’ 
disciplinary counsel prepare no annual report.24 
 In addition, we turned to reports of disciplinary actions in the 
state bar journals and other practitioner-oriented publications. These 
also are far from uniform in their reporting of attorney disciplinary 
actions, ranging from exhaustive reporting of all public discipline25 to 
sketchy and incomplete examples of disciplinary actions.26 Finally, 
the courts of many, but not all, states issue opinions in attorney dis-
cipline cases, which are available in reporters and electronic data-
bases.27 
                                                                                                                      
 20. For example, an article in Texas Lawyer about the “gender gap” in attorney disci-
pline in Texas reported that there were 159 disciplinary actions in calendar year 2000, 23 
of which (or 14.5%) were against women. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Discipline Actions and 
the Gender Gap, TEX. LAW., Aug. 5, 2002, at 33 (citing State Bar of Texas as source). For 
our database, we located 229 attorney disciplinary cases decided in calendar year 2000, of 
which 38 (or 16.6%) were against women. The difference is most likely attributable to our 
use of sources in addition to the State Bar of Texas. Our total of 229 cases for 2000 is also 
closer to what the State Bar of Texas reported as the total number of cases for 2001, which 
was 233. Id. In addition, the Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline reported 301 cases 
for a one-year period that included part of 1999. See Campbell & Kollman, supra note 15, 
at 260 (excluding private reprimands or orders for rehabilitation). As another example of a 
state for which it was difficult to determine the precise number of cases, see the descrip-
tion of the sources used for Connecticut (on file with authors). 
 21. E.g., STATE BAR OF GA., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE OPERATIONAL YEAR 2000-2001; SUPREME COURT OF N.J., 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS, 2000 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 
(2001) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY 2000 REPORT]; N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOC. COMM. ON PROF’L 
DISCIPLINE, ANNUAL REPORT ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK STATE FOR THE YEAR 
2000 (2001) (on file with authors). 
 22. E.g., ARIZ. STATE BAR, SANCTIONED ATTORNEYS-2000, at http://www.azbar.org/Discipline/ 
2000.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004); MASS. BD. OF OVERSEERS, OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL, 
DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS AND ADMONITIONS, at http://www.state.ma.us/obcbbo/decisions.htm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2004); MICH. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE BD., DISCIPLINED ATTORNEY 
CHECKER, at http://www.checker.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 23. E.g., N.M. DISCIPLINARY BD. 2000 STATISTICAL REPORT (2001) (on file with au-
thors). 
 24. For example, the State Bar of Nevada does not issue an annual report regarding 
the discipline of Nevada attorneys. E-mail from Torri Slaughter, State Bar of Nevada, to 
Patricia Hatamyar (June 20, 2001) (on file with authors). 
 25. See, e.g., Lawyer Disciplinary Actions, 35 ARK. LAW. 44 (Summer 2000). 
 26. See, e.g., From the OCDC, MO. BAR BULL., May 2000, at 22. 
 27. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Foster, 995 P.2d 1138 (Okla. 2000). 
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2.   Gender Proportions in Total Attorney Populations 
 For the numbers of all male and female attorneys nationally and 
in each individual state, we used the 1995 figures published in 1999 
by the American Bar Foundation,28 which were the most comprehen-
sive and recent figures we could find.29 We could not locate any other 
reports of the number of male and female attorneys in each state.30 
Many state bar associations do not maintain these figures, or main-
tain them based only on voluntary responses. 
 At first it may appear that we compared apples and oranges, since 
the disciplinary cases we examined dated from calendar year 2000 
while the gender proportions were estimated in 1995. However, the 
time lag is not as great as first appears.  
 First, even though the opinions included in the database are from 
2000, a good portion of them cover conduct that occurred several 
years—even more than five years—earlier,31 so the comparison is 
more apples-to-apples than might be imagined. While we did not code 
the cases based on the year in which the misconduct actually oc-
                                                                                                                      
 28. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN 1995 (1999). Slightly different national figures were also reported in ABA 
COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, BASIC FACTS FROM WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK 
AT THE NUMBERS 1 (1995) [hereinafter BASIC FACTS] (reporting 896,172 lawyers in the 
United States in 1995, of which 207,738, or 23%, were women). 
 29. An August 23, 2002 telephone conversation with the ABA revealed that although 
a report of 2000 figures is in progress, the study is not complete at the time of this writing. 
See also E-mail from Jodi Polster, 312-988-6580, to Nancy Cowden (March 12, 2002) 
(“[T]he latest edition is currently being written but I do not have a publishing date for 
when it will become available.”). 
 30. The American Bar Association compiles an annual National Lawyer Population 
Survey based on state-reported figures, but there were several problems with using these 
figures. See, e.g., ABA, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY STATISTICS (2000) [herein-
after 2000 POPULATION SURVEY] (on file with authors). First, we did not obtain a copy of 
the 2000 Population Survey from the ABA; the ABA declined to share it with us on the 
ground that it is “inaccurate.” Telephone conversation of Lee Peoples, with Tracie Moxley, 
ABA Market Research Department (April 9, 2003) (We obtained a copy from state bar 
counsel, to whom the ABA sends the completed surveys as a courtesy.). Second, not all 
states compile statistics based on gender, so the ABA’s information is incomplete for our 
purposes. Third, the 2000 Population Survey purports to report only the number of attor-
neys resident in each state. Because we included cases of reciprocal discipline in our data-
base when calculating the number of disciplined attorneys for each state (although we ex-
cluded duplicate reciprocals when calculating figures on a national basis), it was more con-
sistent to use the number of all attorneys licensed in each state, rather than merely resi-
dents. That said, the percentages by state of male and female attorneys reported in the 
2000 Population Survey are, in most cases, extremely close to the updated percentages we 
obtained for those same states on our own. See infra Table 2, at p. 802. 
 31. See, e.g., Discipline, 8 NEV. LAW. 29 (2000) (order of suspension describing mis-
conduct that occurred as early as 1992); cf. CLARK REPORT, supra note 19, at 17 (reporting 
as one of many problems with the disciplinary system in 1970, “[c]umbersome structures 
that result in an inordinate time gap between the inception and conclusion of disciplinary 
proceedings”); MCKAY REPORT, supra note 10, at 66 (reporting some improvement in 1991, 
but still finding “a significant delay in the processing of cases” in a “significant minority of 
jurisdictions”). 
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curred (which is not consistently available from the reports), our ad-
mittedly unscientific sense is that between the cases that involved 
conduct occurring in the early 1990s and the cases that involved con-
duct occurring as late as 1999, there is probably a rough approxima-
tion centering on 1995.  
 Second, the proportion of female attorneys has increased since 
1995 in every state for which figures are available.32 Thus, the differ-
ence between the percentage of attorneys in 1995 who were female 
and the percentage of disciplined attorneys who were female (as re-
ported in 2000) is actually smaller than the difference would be if we 
had been able to use the percentage of all attorneys in 2000 who were 
female. For example, roughly 12% of the disciplined attorneys in our 
sample were women. Women made up only 24% of attorneys nation-
wide in 1995, but that percentage grew to “almost a third of the na-
tion’s lawyers” in 2000.33 In other words, the true gap between the 
percentage of female disciplined attorneys and female attorneys gen-
erally is probably even greater than we found in our study. 
 As a checking mechanism, we obtained updated figures for the 
gender breakdown of the attorney population in nineteen states.34 We 
conducted some of the statistical analyses using these updated fig-
ures. No significant differences in results were apparent when the 
updated figures were used, which will be discussed at various points 
below.35  
D.   Coding the Data 
 Our code book for the data covered the following pieces of informa-
tion that might be extracted from the published reports: the state of 
discipline; the disciplined attorney’s first and last name, gender, age, 
year of admission to the bar in the state of discipline, and legal posi-
tion held; the type of violation(s) the attorney committed; the final 
sanction imposed against the attorney; whether the discipline im-
posed was reciprocal, and if so, from what state; the existence of a 
prior disciplinary sanction against the attorney; the type of com-
                                                                                                                      
 32. Compare infra tbl.3, at p. 803, with infra tbl.18, at p. 853. See also, e.g., 
CONSULTANT ON LEGAL EDUC. TO THE ABA, ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, at 21 (2001) (The 
percent of female law students has increased from 1995 to 1999.), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled. 
 33. DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 5 (2001). But see 2000 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 30 (indicating in an 
unofficial report that of the states reporting gender percentages, approximately 27.5% of 
attorneys are women). 
 34. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas (on file with authors). 
 35. See infra tbl.2 at p. 802; infra tbl.3, at p. 803. 
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plainant; the type of legal matter in which the violation(s) occurred; 
and any aggravating or mitigating factors mentioned in the report. 
 None of the states included all the potential items of information 
in their reports, and some hardly included any. What could be 
gleaned from the reports was coded, and if there was no information 
in the report pertaining to a particular factor, that cell was left 
blank.36  
1.   Determining Gender 
 Most of the reports identified the sanctioned attorneys by name 
but did not explicitly state their gender. We initially coded the attor-
neys as male or female by using common American assumptions of 
gender based upon a person’s first name.37 On occasion, if a name 
was unfamiliar, we consulted a “baby name” book.38 We confirmed—
and sometimes changed—our initial classification, where possible, by 
noticing any gendered pronouns used in the available report (“he,” 
“she,” “his,” or “her”). This method was also employed when the at-
torney’s first name could be used for either a man or a woman (such 
as Lee, Kelly, or Chris).  
 This left a relatively small number of attorneys (thirty-four of 
3575, or less than 1%) whose gender could not be classified. Their 
gender was coded as “cannot determine.” 
2.   Type of Violation Committed 
 We developed seventeen different categories of ethical violations 
to code this variable: competence and diligence; scope of representa-
tion; communications with client; fees; confidentiality; conflict of in-
terest; improper management or misappropriation of client or third 
party funds or property; improper litigation conduct; fraudulent or 
deceptive activity; improper communications with persons other than 
clients or tribunals; unauthorized practice of law and other violations 
of law firms’ duties; criminal activity; misconduct related to a disci-
plinary proceeding involving the same lawyer; and state bar re-
quirements. We also had codes for “other,” “not available,” and “re-
ciprocal discipline.”39  
                                                                                                                      
 36. Some of the information, such as an attorney’s age or year of admission to the bar, 
might theoretically have been available in sources other than the published disciplinary 
report, such as Martindale-Hubbell, but we did not attempt to locate any information be-
yond the report. 
 37. There may be an occasional boy named Sue, but we accepted that risk. 
 38. BRUCE LANSKY, THE VERY BEST BABY NAME BOOK IN THE WHOLE WIDE WORLD 
(1984). 
 39. The code book, which is available on request from the authors, provides more de-
tail on each of the categories, including the corresponding Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MRPC], for each, if any. 
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 We developed these codes by starting with the groupings sug-
gested by the articles of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.40 
We then modified the MRPC groupings to reflect some categories ac-
tually reported by most state bar disciplinary agencies, although not 
explicitly linked to the MRPC.41 We tested the suitability of the codes 
by attempting to code hundreds of sample disciplinary reports, and 
then adjusting the codes to account for problems that arose in appli-
cation. 
 If the reporting agency provided a synopsis of the facts leading to 
discipline, the underlying facts, rather than the particular discipli-
nary rules the agency invoked, were evaluated to code the viola-
tion(s). This was primarily because the reporting agency frequently 
characterized one item of misconduct as a violation of as many differ-
ent provisions as could reasonably fit, whereas our goal was to assign 
only one code to each type of misconduct. Moreover, we wanted to 
categorize the same conduct consistently across states. If the report-
ing agency only stated the disciplinary rules violated without de-
scribing the underlying violation, we had no choice but to use that 
characterization in the coding. 
 We included for each disciplined attorney only the different types 
of violations he or she committed, not the number of times he or she 
might have committed that type of violation. For example, if it was 
reported that an attorney failed to return the phone calls of Client X, 
Client Y, and Client Z, that would be counted only once, in the cate-
gory of “communications with client.” If it was reported that an at-
torney failed to return the phone calls of Client X, let the statute of 
limitations run on Client X’s claim, and stole Client X’s funds held in 
trust, that would be counted as three separate violations, one for 
“communications with client,” one for “competence and diligence,” 
and one for “improper management or misappropriation.” After some 
trial and error, we allowed eight columns for types of violations. No 
attorney in our sample committed more than eight different types of 
violation (as we classified them). 
 The reports sometimes list a catch-all violation, such as engaging 
in acts of moral turpitude, violating or attempting to violate a rule of 
professional conduct, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the admini-
stration of justice, or engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fit-
ness to practice law. These were not separately coded when the un-
                                                                                                                      
 40. We did not include Article 6, Public Service (including pro bono representation), 
as these provisions appear to be aspirational. 
 41. For example, many states that classify disciplinary actions by violation have a 
separate category for “fraud” or “misrepresentation.” E.g., ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & 
DISCIPLINARY COMM’N OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2001) 
[hereinafter ILLINOIS 2000 REPORT] (“fraudulent or deceptive activity”); NEW JERSEY 2000 
REPORT, supra note 21, at 6  (“fraud/misrepresentation”) (on file with authors). 
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derlying conduct was discernible and could be coded in a more de-
scriptive category. They were coded as “other” when there was no 
further information available. 
 Inevitably, some misconduct might be classified in more than one 
category.42 For example, lying to a client could just as well be catego-
rized in “communications with client” as in “fraudulent or deceptive 
activity.” For each such example, we made a decision to call it one or 
the other and then consistently coded all subsequent instances.43 
3.   Sanction Imposed 
 The final sanction ordered against the attorney was coded in only 
one of ten exclusive categories: disbarment (which includes voluntary 
resignation from the bar if the underlying charges were described in 
the report); voluntary resignation from the bar with unspecified 
charges pending; interim or indefinite suspension; term suspension; 
public reprimand; private reprimand; probation; and transfer to dis-
ability inactive status.44  
 If the sanction was a term suspension, the length (in months) of 
that suspension was also noted. To code the suspension length con-
sistently across states, retroactive suspensions were computed pro-
spectively only.45  
 Because states sometimes have different classifications or names 
for essentially the same sanction, it was necessary for consistency to 
code according to our definition of the punishment rather than the 
state’s. For example, although New Jersey issues both “admonitions” 
and “reprimands,”46 both were coded as a “public reprimand” in our 
database, as we believed that one category for public reprimand and 
one for private reprimand (whatever they might be called) were suffi-
cient to capture the severity of that level of punishment. All assump-
tions made to conform any particular state’s classifications are de-
scribed in the authors’ list of sources. 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Cf. Levin, supra note 15, at 39 (“At times, a lawyer’s misconduct can seemingly 
fall within two different black-letter standards. . . . [of the ABA Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions].”). 
 43. In the example given, we decided to code it as “fraudulent or deceptive activity” 
because many state bar disciplinary offices separately categorize and report “fraudulent or 
deceptive activities,” see supra note 41, and it seems that lying to a client is qualitatively 
different from failing to return a client’s phone calls. 
 44. See, e.g., ALASKA BAR ASSOC., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 24 (2001) (on file with au-
thors) (describing “disability inactive” status as “an incapacitating illness, addiction to 
drugs or intoxicants, senility, death, disappearance, or judicially declared incompetence of 
an attorney, rather than actual misconduct by the attorney”). The other two categories 
were “other” and “not stated,” the incidence of both of which were very rare. 
 45. For instance, if a disciplinary agency, in an order dated July 1, 2000, entered what 
it called a “twelve-month suspension” against an attorney, but stated that the suspension 
was “retroactive to January 1, 2000,” that was coded as a six-month suspension. 
 46. NEW JERSEY 2000 REPORT, supra note 21, at 17-18. 
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4.   Type of Legal Job Held by the Attorney 
 Mindful that female attorneys are more likely to be in solo prac-
tice, federal or state government positions, private industry, or legal 
aid than male attorneys,47 we attempted to classify the disciplined at-
torneys as prosecutors, other types of government lawyers, public de-
fenders, other types of court-appointed attorneys, in-house counsel, 
bankruptcy trustees, or in private practice. Most disciplinary opin-
ions, however, do not provide sufficient information to reliably per-
form this classification. We made certain assumptions to increase the 
number of observations for which we could code this variable, such as 
an assumption that an attorney found guilty of a trust account viola-
tion was in private practice. Nonetheless, most cases are still missing 
this variable, and we elected not to use the variable in the regres-
sions. 
5. Type of Complainant and Type of Case in Which Violation was 
Committed 
 As women are slightly less likely than men to be in the private 
practice of law,48 we thought that the identity of the complainants 
(such as a client or a judge), and the type of case (such as domestic 
relations or personal injury) might prove relevant to explaining any 
gender difference in disciplinary rates. Unfortunately, as with the at-
torneys’ job types, most disciplinary opinions do not provide this in-
formation. We coded those that did and left the cells blank in cases in 
which no information about these matters could be found. Again, 
however, with most cases missing these variables, we elected not to 
use the variables in the regressions.  
6. Prior Disciplinary Actions Against the Attorney and Other 
Aggravating or Mitigating Factors  
 The ABA has promulgated standards, including aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, for courts and disciplinary agencies to con-
sider when determining the severity of punishment for ethical viola-
                                                                                                                      
 47. BASIC FACTS, supra note 28, at 2, 4 (48% of women in private practice in 1991 
were solo practitioners, compared to 44% of men; 12% of female lawyers worked in gov-
ernment, compared to 7% of male lawyers in 1991); see also RHODE, supra note 33, at 23; 
CARSON, supra note 28, at 10. 
 48. BASIC FACTS, supra note 28, at 2 (estimating that 70% and 74% of female and 
male lawyers, respectively, were in private practice in 1995); CARSON, supra note 28, at 10; 
Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition, 20 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 19, 47 (1986) (In 1980, 55.7% of female lawyers were in private practice, com-
pared to 69.4% of male lawyers.). 
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tions.49 Many states explicitly reference and apply these standards in 
their written reports or opinions.50 For those that did, we coded the 
factors loosely based on the ABA standards, adding numerous aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances mentioned in the reports and 
opinions that were not based on the ABA standards. Again, these 
cells were left blank if the opinion did not explicitly mention any 
such circumstances, or at least did not characterize such circum-
stances explicitly as aggravating or mitigating factors in determining 
punishment. 
 The existence or nonexistence of any prior disciplinary actions 
against the attorney was coded in a variable separate from aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances as a whole. This was because most 
states do, in fact, mention an attorney’s prior disciplinary record, but 
often do not explicitly characterize it as an aggravating factor. To 
avoid generating a false number of “no prior discipline” cases, we 
classified each case in one of three ways: (1) if the opinion mentioned 
the existence of a prior disciplinary record, this was coded as “yes, 
has prior record”; (2) if the opinion expressly stated that the attorney 
had no prior disciplinary record, this was coded as “no, has no prior 
record”; and (3) if the opinion did not mention a prior record one way 
or the other, the cell was left blank.  
 Of course, the existence or nonexistence of a prior disciplinary re-
cord was not also coded as an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance. 
E.   Eliminating Instances of Reciprocal Discipline 
 For calculations involving individual states, we used the database 
consisting of all 3575 cases (counting only, of course, the cases aris-
ing in the particular state being calculated). For calculations on a na-
tionwide level, we created an alternate database that eliminated all 
instances we could find of the same attorney being disciplined in 
more than one state in the year 2000. For example, if the attorney 
was first disciplined in New York, and then reciprocally disciplined 
in New Jersey, we left in the entry from New York and eliminated 
the entry from New Jersey. The alternate database with “no recipro-
cals” included 3493 cases. 
F.   Statistical Methodology 
 A chi square distribution was performed to examine the statistical 
significance of gender differences in the overall rate of discipline, the 
                                                                                                                      
 49. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1991 & Supp. 1992). For a 
cogent critique of these standards, including the aggravating and mitigating factors, see 
Levin, supra note 15. 
 50. For a catalogue of such states, see Levin, supra note 15, at 33-36. 
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types of sanctions imposed, and the types of violations committed. 
The chi square test is a theoretical sampling distribution that allows 
one to test the assumption that a sample was drawn from a popula-
tion with a given distribution. It is used to compare expected to ac-
tual values in categorical data to test for statistical differences.51  
 For example, a primary research question here was whether male 
and female attorneys incur disciplinary sanctions in the same pro-
portions as their proportions in the overall attorney population. The 
null hypothesis for this question is that the percentages of disci-
plined attorneys who are male and female are equal to the percent-
ages of all attorneys who are male and female, respectively. Since 
about 77% of all attorneys were male, one would expect, if the null 
hypothesis were true, that about 77% of disciplined attorneys would 
be male. In our study, it turned out that 88% of the disciplined attor-
neys were male. 
 The chi square test indicates the probability that the difference 
between the actual and expected values (in this example, 88% and 
77%) could have occurred by chance. When that probability is 10% or 
lower (which is also called a confidence level of 90% or higher), the 
difference is commonly called statistically “significant.” When that 
probability is 5% or lower (also called a confidence level of 95% or 
higher), the difference is commonly called “highly significant.” Given 
one degree of freedom,52 the critical values for the chi square test are 
2.71 and 3.84 for significant and highly significant differences, re-
spectively.53 
 The regression analyses were performed using OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares). This procedure seeks to determine whether changes 
in a given independent variable make a significant contribution to 
changes in a given dependent variable. Either SAS or SPSS—
software packages used to conduct statistical analysis in academia 
and industry—was used in all calculations. 
III.   RESULTS 
A.   Overall Rates of Discipline 
 There was a highly significant difference in the overall rates at 
which male and female attorneys were disciplined. There were 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and 
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 792 n.268 (1995); Taber et al., supra note 3, at 
1237. 
 52. There are (m - 1) x (n - 1) degrees of freedom when testing independence in an m x 
n table. FREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 488. Here, there are two gender categories, 
male and female, and two disciplinary categories, disciplined and not disciplined. This two-
by-two matrix yields one degree of freedom. 
 53. Id. at A-88. 
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857,931 licensed attorneys in the United States in 1995, of which 
about 76.4% (655,623) were male and 23.6% (202,308) were female.54 
As explained above, our “no reciprocals” database consisted of 3493 
orders of attorney discipline decided in calendar year 2000 in the 
fifty states and the District of Columbia.55 Eliminating the cases of 
unknown gender left 3461 cases. 
 Based on the proportions of men and women in the attorney popu-
lation as a whole, one would expect that about 2644 of the disciplined 
attorneys would be male and 817 female.56 In fact, 3055 (88.3%) of 
the disciplined attorneys were male and 406 (11.7%) were female.57 
In other words, less than half the number of female attorneys that 
would be expected to be disciplined (based on their proportion of the 
attorney population) were actually disciplined. The chi square test 
indicates that the difference between actual and expected numbers is 
highly significant at a confidence level in excess of 99%.58 
 Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 show the overall difference between 
actual and expected rates of discipline by gender. Table 1 and Figure 
1 use the American Bar Foundation figures for the number of male 
and female attorneys in the population.59 Table 2 uses more recent 
figures on the number of male and female attorneys that we obtained 
from nineteen states.60 The updated figures show an even larger dif-
ference between the gender proportions in the overall attorney popu-
lation (28.2% women) and the gender proportions in the disciplined 
attorney population (12.1% women). Again, the chi square test indi-
cates that this difference is highly significant at a confidence level in 
excess of 99%. 
                                                                                                                      
 54. CARSON, supra note 28, at 23. 
 55. See supra Part II.E. 
 56. The expected number of male disciplined attorneys is [3461 x (655,623 ÷ 857,931)], 
and the expected number of female disciplined attorneys is [3461 x (202,308 ÷ 857,931)]. 
 57. If one assumed that all 34 cases of unknown gender were women, and added those 
cases back, then 87.5% and 12.5% of the disciplined attorneys would have been men 
(3055/3493) and women (438/3493) respectively. 
 58. The chi square values are available from the authors on request. 
 59. CARSON, supra note 28, at 23. 
 60. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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TABLE 1 
National Actual and Expected Rates of Attorney Discipline  
by Gender 
Gender Number of 
Attorneys* 
Percent of 
All Attor-
neys 
Expected 
Number of 
Disciplined 
Attorneys  
Actual 
Number of 
Disciplined 
Attorneys 
Percent of 
Disciplined 
Attorneys 
Male* 655,623 76.419% 2,644 3,055 88.269% 
Fe-
male* 
202,308 23.581% 817 406 11.731% 
Total* 857,931 100%  3,461 100% 
*Source: CARSON, supra note 28, at 23. 
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TABLE 2 
Actual and Expected Rates of Attorney Discipline by Gender  
in Nineteen Updated States 
Gender 
 
Number of 
Attorneys* 
 
Percent of 
All Attor-
neys 
Expected 
Number of 
Disciplined 
Attorneys 
Actual 
Number of 
Disciplined 
Attorneys 
Percent of 
Disciplined 
Attorneys 
Male* 279,589 71.8% 840 1028 87.9% 
Fe-
male* 
109,671 28.2% 330 142 12.1% 
Total* 389,260 100%  1170 100% 
*Sources: See supra Part II.C.2 (on file with authors). 
 We also compared the actual and expected number of disciplined 
attorneys by gender for each of the individual fifty states and the 
District of Columbia based upon the proportion of male and female 
attorneys in that state.61 For example, California had 113,173 attor-
neys, of which 83,286 (73.6%) were male and 29,887 (26.4%) were 
female. But of California’s 449 disciplined attorneys, 378 (84.2%) 
were male and 68 (15.1%) were female, a difference that is highly 
significant at a confidence level in excess of 99%. 
 Table 18 shows that the actual number of disciplined male attor-
neys exceeded the expected number of disciplined male attorneys 
(and, correspondingly, the actual number of female disciplined attor-
neys was less than the expected number of female disciplined attor-
neys) in all but four states. There was a highly significant difference 
(at a confidence level in excess of 95%) between actual and expected 
numbers of attorneys disciplined by gender in twenty-four states and 
the District of Columbia,62 and a significant difference (at a confi-
dence level in excess of 90%) in Iowa.63  
 In general, the states with a highly significant difference between 
actual and expected figures included the states with the largest 
number of lawyers. In fact, Michigan was the only state with more 
than 100 disciplined attorneys in 2000 for which the difference be-
                                                                                                                      
 61. See infra tbl.18, at p. 853. Due to its length, it is reproduced at the end of this Ar-
ticle. 
 62. Chi square greater than 3.841 with one degree of freedom. The states meeting this 
criterion were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 
 63. Chi square greater than 2.706 with one degree of freedom. 
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tween actual and expected numbers of disciplined lawyers by gender 
was not statistically significant.64 
 We also performed a state-by-state analysis of disciplinary rates 
by gender in the nineteen states from which we received updated fig-
ures for the number of licensed attorneys and the gender proportions 
thereof. Table 3 shows the results. The difference between actual and 
expected numbers was highly significant in eleven of the nineteen 
states and significant in a twelfth state. Again, the differences are 
more significant in the states with the larger attorney populations.  
TABLE 3 
State-by-State Comparison of Genders of All Attorneys and Genders 
of Disciplined Attorneys (Nineteen Updated States) 
State No. of 
Licensed 
Attor-
neys 
% (no.) 
Male 
Attorneys
% (no.) 
Female 
Attor-
neys 
No. of 
Attor-
neys 
Disci-
plined 
in 2000 
% (no.) 
of Male 
Disci-
plined 
Attor-
neys† 
% (no.) 
of Female 
Disci-
plined 
Attorneys 
Alaska** 3,515 70.2% 
(2,467) 
29.8% 
(1,048) 
14 92.9% 
(13) 
0% 
(0) 
Arizona** 18,339 71.3% 
(13,083) 
28.7% 
(5,256) 
71 90.1% 
(64) 
9.9% 
(7) 
Colorado** 28,390 70.4% 
(19,999) 
29.6% 
(8,391) 
43 83.7% 
(36) 
14% 
(6) 
Florida** 62,579 71.6% 
(44,785) 
28.4% 
(17,794) 
310 87.7% 
(272) 
11.6% 
(36) 
Georgia** 32,780 70% 
(22,946) 
30% 
(9,834) 
90 89% 
(80) 
10% 
(9) 
Idaho 3,182 79.4% 
(2,526) 
20.6% 
(656) 
6 100% 
(6) 
0% 
(0) 
Illinois** 73,661 70% 
(51,563) 
30% 
(22,098) 
123 92.7% 
(114) 
7.3% 
(9) 
Kentucky 13,484 73.7% 
(9,936) 
26.3% 
(3,548) 
48 77.1% 
(37) 
22.9% 
(11) 
                                                                                                                      
 64. In Michigan, the number of expected male disciplined attorneys (101) was lower 
than the number of actual male disciplined attorneys (105), and the number of expected 
female disciplined attorneys (25) was higher than the number of actual female disciplined 
attorneys (21), but the differences were not statistically significant. 
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State No. of 
Licensed 
Attor-
neys 
% (no.) 
Male 
Attorneys
% (no.) 
Female 
Attor-
neys 
No. of 
Attor-
neys 
Disci-
plined 
in 2000 
% (no.) 
of Male 
Disci-
plined 
Attor-
neys† 
% (no.) 
of Female 
Disci-
plined 
Attorneys 
Louisi-
ana** 
18,678 73.7% 
(13,767) 
26.3% 
(4,911) 
80 88.8% 
(71) 
11.2% 
(9) 
Maine 4,955 70.5% 
(3,491) 
29.5% 
(1,464) 
10 90% 
(9) 
10% 
(1) 
Missis-
sippi* 
6,949 79.4% 
(5,522) 
20.5% 
(1,427) 
28 92.9% 
(26) 
7.1% 
(2) 
Montana 2,515 75.6% 
(1,900) 
24.4% 
(615) 
13 92.3% 
(12) 
7.7% 
(1) 
Nebraska 8,445 75.9% 
(6,412) 
24.1% 
(2,033) 
12 75% 
(9) 
25% 
(3) 
New Mex-
ico 
6,664 67.4% 
(4,492) 
32.6% 
(2,172) 
4 100% 
(4) 
0% 
(0) 
North 
Carolina** 
12,200 75% 
(9,150) 
25% 
(3,050) 
63 88.9% 
(56) 
11.1% 
(7) 
Oregon** 9,904 71.3% 
(7,062) 
28.7% 
(2,842) 
56 83.9% 
(47) 
16.1% 
(9) 
Rhode Is-
land 
5,105 73.6% 
(3,755) 
26.4% 
(1,350) 
5 100% 
(5) 
0% 
(0) 
South 
Carolina** 
10,391 73.5% 
(7,640) 
26.4% 
(2,751) 
57 89.5% 
(51) 
10.5% 
(6) 
Texas** 67,524 72.7% 
(49,093) 
27.3% 
(18,431) 
230 83% 
(191) 
16.5% 
(38) 
Sources for the percentages of male and female attorneys by state: see supra Part 
II.C.2 (on file with authors). 
† Percentages may not add to 100% because some attorneys’ gender could not be 
determined from either the disciplinary opinion or the attorney’s first name. 
* Difference between expected and actual proportions of disciplined attorneys is 
statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 90% (chi square test). 
** Difference between expected and actual proportions of disciplined attorneys is 
statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 95% (chi square test). 
2004]                ARE WOMEN MORE ETHICAL LAWYERS? 805 
 
B.   Types of Punishment 
 We compared the proportions of men and women incurring differ-
ent types of sanctions to two groups: first, the population of all li-
censed attorneys (Table 4 and Figure 2), and second, the sample of 
all disciplined attorneys (Table 6). Not surprisingly (given the results 
in the last section), when compared to the total attorney population, 
the actual number of male attorneys exceeded the expected number 
(and the actual number of female attorneys was less than the ex-
pected number) in each category of sanction, all at differences in 
rates that were highly significant.65 For example, with women com-
prising 23.6% of the overall attorney population, one would expect 
211 women to be disbarred (of the 893 total disbarments). In fact, 
women only accounted for 86 of the disbarments, or about 40% of the 
number expected.  
TABLE 4 
Types of Punishment Incurred by Gender 
Compared to Population of All Licensed Attorneys 
Sanction Total No. 
(%) of At-
torneys 
Incurring 
Sanction† 
Male 
Expected 
No. 
(76.419%)†
Male 
Actual No.  
(%) 
Female 
Expected 
No. 
(23.581%)
† 
Female 
Actual No.  
(%) 
Disbarment 
(includes 
resignations)* 
893 (26%) 682 
 
807 (90%) 211 86 (10%) 
Indefinite 
Suspension* 
355 (10%) 271 
 
316 (89%) 84 39 (11%) 
Term Suspen-
sion* 
1,029 
(30%) 
786 888 (86%) 243 141 (14%) 
Public Repri-
mand* 
778 (23%) 595 689 (89%) 183 89 (11%) 
Private Rep-
rimand* 
147 (4%) 112 132 (90%) 35 15 (10%) 
Probation* 192 (6%) 147 163 (85%) 45 29 (15%) 
                                                                                                                      
 65. See infra tbl.4, at p. 805. We performed the same analysis (type of punishment by 
gender as compared to all licensed attorneys) using the more recent gender proportions 
provided by nineteen states. See supra Part II.C.2 The difference between actual and ex-
pected gender proportions remained statistically significant at a confidence level greater 
than 95% in all types of sanction except disability inactive (for which the confidence level 
exceeded 90%). 
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Sanction Total No. 
(%) of At-
torneys 
Incurring 
Sanction† 
Male 
Expected 
No. 
(76.419%)†
Male 
Actual No.  
(%) 
Female 
Expected 
No. 
(23.581%)
† 
Female 
Actual No.  
(%) 
Disability In-
active* 
55 (2%) 42 49 (89%) 13 6 (11%) 
Total 3,449†† 2,635 3,044 (88%) 814 405 (12%) 
† Based on attorney population of 76.419% men and 23.581% women.66 
†† Does not include 34 attorneys for whom gender could not be determined, nor 
12 attorneys whose sanctions were coded as “other” or “not stated.” 
* Difference between expected and actual proportions of disciplined attorneys is 
statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 95% (chi square test). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 We also looked at disbarments (including resignations with disci-
plinary proceedings pending) in individual states. Table 5 shows the 
fifteen states in which there was a statistically significant gender dif-
ference in disbarment rate.67  
 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See CARSON, supra note 28, at 23. 
 67. In all the other states, except for Kentucky and West Virginia, the actual number 
of disbarred male attorneys exceeded the expected number of disbarred male attorneys, 
but the difference was not statistically significant. In addition, in all the states in Table 5 
from which we obtained more recent figures on attorney population and gender proportion 
(Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas), the difference 
between expected and actual numbers of disbarred attorneys by gender remained statisti-
cally significant. 
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TABLE 5 
State-by-State Comparison of Expected vs. Actual Number of  
Disbarments† by Gender Compared to Population of  
All Licensed Attorneys in State 
State % Male 
Attorneys
% Female 
Attorneys 
No. of At-
torneys 
Disbarred 
% (no.) of 
Disbarred 
who are 
Male 
% (no.) of 
Disbarred 
who are 
Female 
California** 73.6% 26.4% 163 86% (140) 14% (23) 
Colorado** 75.1% 24.9% 12 100% (12) 0% (0) 
District of 
Columbia** 
69% 31% 40 85% (34) 15% (6) 
Florida** 78.4% 21.6% 66 95% (63) 5% (3) 
Georgia** 77.2% 22.8% 22 95% (21) 5% (1) 
Illinois** 77.1% 22.9% 41 93% (38) 7% (3) 
Indiana* 80.7% 19.3% 14 100% (14) 0% (0) 
Iowa** 82.8% 17.2% 1 0% (0) 100% (1) 
Louisiana** 79.7% 20.3% 19 100% (19) 0% (0) 
New Jersey** 75.9% 24.1% 46 91% (42) 9% (4) 
New York** 74.4% 25.6% 108 95% (103) 5% (5) 
North Caro-
lina* 
78.4% 21.6% 19 95% (18) 5% (1) 
Oklahoma* 80.1% 19.9% 11 100% (11) 0% (0) 
Pennsyl-
vania** 
75.1% 24.9% 33 91% (30) 9% (3) 
Texas* 77.6% 22.4% 45 89% (40) 11% (5) 
† “Disbarments” here includes resignations from the bar with disciplinary 
charges pending. 
* Difference between expected and actual proportions of disciplined attorneys is 
statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 90% (chi square test). 
** Difference between expected and actual proportions of disciplined attorneys is 
statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 95% (chi square test). 
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 Table 6 shows the results when the expected proportions of male 
and female disbarments are calculated using the actual gender pro-
portions of only disciplined attorneys. There was a highly significant 
difference in the proportions of men and women being disbarred 
(with more men disbarred than expected) and receiving term suspen-
sions (with more women receiving term suspensions than expected). 
These results were not materially different for the nineteen states 
providing more recent figures.68 
 Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of sanctions by gender in 
our sample. Most notably, while 26% of disciplined men were dis-
barred, only 21% of disciplined women were disbarred. A larger per-
centage of disciplined women (35%) than disciplined men (29%) re-
ceived term suspensions. 
TABLE 6 
Types of Punishment Incurred by Gender 
Compared to Sample of Disciplined Attorneys Only 
Sanction Total No. 
(%) of 
Attorneys 
Incurring 
Sanction† 
Male 
Expected 
No. 
(88.269%)
†† 
Male Actual 
No. (%) 
Female 
Expected 
No. 
(11.731%) 
†† 
Female 
Actual No. 
(%) 
Disbarment 
(includes 
resignations)* 
893 
(26%) 
 
788 807 
(27%) 
105 
 
86 
(21%) 
Indefinite Sus-
pension 
355 
(10%) 
313 316 
(10%) 
42 39 
(10%) 
Term Suspen-
sion* 
1,029 
(30%) 
908 888 
(29%) 
121 141 
(35%) 
Public Repri-
mand 
778 
(23%) 
687 689 
(23%) 
91 89 
(22%) 
Private Repri-
mand 
147 
(4%) 
130 132 
(4%) 
17 15 
(4%) 
Probation 192 
(6%) 
169 163 
(5%) 
23 29 
(7%) 
Disability Inac-
tive 
55 
(2%) 
49 49 
(2%) 
6 6 
(1%) 
                                                                                                                      
 68. More men (263) were actually disbarred than expected (249), and more women 
(61) incurred term suspensions than expected (44). This is significant at a confidence level 
in excess of 95%. 
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Sanction Total No. 
(%) of 
Attorneys 
Incurring 
Sanction† 
Male 
Expected 
No. 
(88.269%)
†† 
Male Actual 
No. (%) 
Female 
Expected 
No. 
(11.731%) 
†† 
Female 
Actual No. 
(%) 
Total 3,449  3,044  405 
† Does not include 34 attorneys for whom gender could not be determined, nor 12 
attorneys whose sanction was coded “other” or “not stated.” 
†† Based on 88.269% of disciplined attorneys being male and 11.731% of disci-
plined attorneys being female.  
*Difference between actual and expected number is significant at a confidence 
level in excess of 95% (chi square test). 
 
FIGURE 3 
Types of Sanctions Incurred by Disciplined Men 
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FIGURE 4 
Types of Sanctions Incurred by Disciplined Women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.   Types of Violations 
 Again, we compared the proportion of men and women committing 
different types of violations to two groups: first, the population of all 
licensed attorneys (Table 7), and second, the sample of all disciplined 
attorneys (Table 8).69  
 The results shown in Table 7 are predictable, given the overall 
gender difference in discipline rates. For almost every category of vio-
lation, when compared to all attorneys, the actual number of viola-
tions by men exceeded the expected number of violations (and con-
versely, the actual number of violations by women was less than the 
expected number), and the difference between actual and expected 
was highly significant. For example, given an attorney population 
that is 76.4% male, one would expect that men would have commit-
ted 882 of the 1154 total violations of competence and diligence. In 
fact, men committed 1002 of such violations, 120 more than expected.  
 Table 8 compares the incidence of actual violations to the gender 
proportions of the disciplined attorneys only, which were 88.3% male 
and 11.7% female. Even looking only at disciplined attorneys, the ac-
tual number of violations by men involving misappropriation and 
                                                                                                                      
 69. As explained above, see supra Part II.D.2, the violations were not exclusive cate-
gories; a single attorney could commit more than one type of violation (up to eight, in fact). 
Conversely, if an attorney committed the same violation with respect to more than one cli-
ent, the violation was only counted once for that attorney. Thus, the percentages in Tables 
7 and 8 must be interpreted carefully. 
Disbarment
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criminal activity exceed the expected number by a highly significant 
amount. For example, of the 798 cases involving misappropriation, 
one would expect that men would have committed 704 violations 
(88.3% of 798). In fact, men committed 721 such violations, 17 more 
than expected. Of the 521 cases involving criminal activity, one 
would expect that men would have committed 460 violations. In fact, 
men committed 480 such violations, 20 more than expected.  
 Surprisingly, again looking only at disciplined attorneys, the ac-
tual number of violations by women exceeded the expected number 
by a statistically significant amount in four categories: competence 
and diligence, communications with client, fees, and state bar re-
quirements. The first three categories are particularly interesting 
because the results appear to cast doubt on female attorneys’ hy-
pothesized better communication skills and “ethic of care.”70 
TABLE 7 
Types of Violations Committed by Gender 
Compared to Population of All Licensed Attorneys 
Violation† Total No. 
of Viola-
tions (% of 
all viola-
tions)†† 
Male 
Ex-
pected 
No. 
(76.419
%)‡ 
Male 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Female 
Ex-
pected 
No. 
(23.581
%)‡ 
Female 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Competence or Dili-
gence** 
1,154  
(17%) 
882 1,002 
(87%) 
272 152 
(13%) 
Scope of Representa-
tion* 
93  
(1%) 
71 79  
(85%) 
22 14  
(15%) 
Communications with 
Client** 
933  
(14%) 
713 801 
(86%) 
220 132 
(14%) 
Fees** 403  
(6%) 
308 340 
(84%) 
95 63  
(16%) 
Confidentiality 18  
(0%) 
14 16  
(89%) 
4 2  
(11%) 
Conflict of Interest** 242  
(4%) 
185 219 
(90%) 
57 23  
(10%) 
Mismanagement or  
Misappropriation of 
Property** 
798  
(12%) 
610 721 
(90%) 
188 77  
(10%) 
                                                                                                                      
 70. See infra Parts IV.H.3-4. 
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Violation† Total No. 
of Viola-
tions (% of 
all viola-
tions)†† 
Male 
Ex-
pected 
No. 
(76.419
%)‡ 
Male 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Female 
Ex-
pected 
No. 
(23.581
%)‡ 
Female 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Improper Litigation 
Conduct** 
336  
(5%) 
257 292 
(87%) 
79 44  
(13%) 
Fraudulent Activity** 618  
(9%) 
472 536 
(87%) 
146 82  
(13%) 
Other Improper Com-
munications* 
101  
(1%) 
77 88  
(87%) 
24 13  
(13%) 
Unauthorized Practice 
of Law, Other Law Firm 
Duties** 
294  
(4%) 
225 264 
(90%) 
69 30  
(10%) 
Criminal Activity** 521  
(8%) 
398 480 
(92%) 
123 41  
(8%) 
Misconduct in Discipli-
nary Proceeding** 
754  
(11%) 
576 653 
(87%) 
178 101 
(13%) 
State Bar Requirements 58  
(1%) 
44 46  
(79%) 
14 12  
(21%) 
Other 100  
(1%) 
76 88  
(88%) 
24 12  
(12%) 
Not Available 277  
(4%) 
212 243 
(88%) 
65 34  
(12%) 
Reciprocal Discipline** 177  
(3%) 
135 162 
(92%) 
42 15  
(8%) 
Total 6,877 5,255 6,030 
(88%) 
1,622 847 
(12%) 
† These are non-exclusive variables in the sense that a single proceeding may in-
volve an attorney who committed more than one type of violation.  
†† Cases of unknown gender excluded. 
‡ Based on population of all attorneys being 76.419% male and 23.581% female. 
* Difference between actual and expected is significant at a confidence level in 
excess of 90% (chi square test). 
** Difference between actual and expected is significant at a confidence level in 
excess of 95% (chi square test). 
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TABLE 8 
Types of Violations Committed by Gender 
Compared to Sample of Disciplined Attorneys Only 
Violation† Total No. of 
Violations 
(% of all vio-
lations)†† 
Male 
Ex-
pected 
No.‡ 
Male 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Female 
Ex-
pected 
No.‡ 
Female 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Competence or Dili-
gence* 
1,154 (17%) 1,019 1,002 
(87%) 
135 152 
(13%) 
Scope of Representation 93 (1%) 82 79 
(85%) 
11 14 
(15%) 
Communications with 
Client** 
933 (14%) 824 801 
(86%) 
109 132 
(14%) 
Fees** 403 (6%) 356 340 
(84%) 
47 63 
(16%) 
Confidentiality 18 (0%) 16 16 
(89%) 
2 2  
(11%) 
Conflict of Interest 242 (4%) 214 219 
(90%) 
28 23 
(10%) 
Mismanagement or 
Misappropriation of 
Property** 
798 (12%) 704 721 
(90%) 
94 77 
(10%) 
Improper Litigation 
Conduct 
336 (5%) 297 292 
(87%) 
39 44 
(13%) 
Fraudulent Activity 618 (9%) 546 536 
(87%) 
72 82 
(13%) 
Other Improper Com-
munications 
101 (1%) 89 88 
(87%) 
12 13 
(13%) 
Unauthorized Practice 
of Law, Other Law Firm 
Duties 
294 (4%) 260 264 
(90%) 
34 30 
(10%) 
Criminal Activity** 521 (8%) 460 480 
(92%) 
61 41  
(8%) 
Misconduct in Discipli-
nary Proceeding 
754 (11%) 666 653 
(87%) 
88 101 
(13%) 
State Bar Require-
ments** 
58 (1%) 51 46 
(79%) 
7 12 
(21%) 
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Violation† Total No. of 
Violations 
(% of all vio-
lations)†† 
Male 
Ex-
pected 
No.‡ 
Male 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Female 
Ex-
pected 
No.‡ 
Female 
Actual 
No. (%) 
Other 100 (1%) 88 88 
(88%) 
12 12 
(12%) 
Not Available 277 (4%) 245 243 
(88%) 
32 34 
(12%) 
Reciprocal Discipline 177 (3%) 156 162 
(92%) 
21 15  
(8%) 
Total 6,877 6,073 6,030 
(88%) 
804 847 
(12%) 
† These are nonexclusive variables in the sense that a single proceeding may in-
volve an attorney who committed more than one type of violation.  
†† Cases of unknown gender excluded. 
‡ Based on sample of disciplined attorneys being 88.269% male and 11.731% female. 
* Difference between actual and expected is significant at a confidence level in 
excess of 90% (chi square test). 
** Difference between actual and expected is significant at a confidence level in 
excess of 95% (chi square test). 
D.   Prior Disciplinary Proceedings and Other Aggravating  
and Mitigating Factors 
 As explained earlier,71 we coded the presence or absence of a prior 
disciplinary record separately from other aggravating and mitigating 
factors. The presence or absence of a prior record was mentioned in 
924 of the 3,493 cases (exclusive of reciprocals). Table 9 tabulates 
those cases. 
TABLE 9 
Prior Disciplinary Record by Gender 
 No. (%) of Men No (%) of Women Total* 
No Prior Record 305 (37%) 41 (40%) 346 (38%) 
Has Prior Record 515 (63%) 61 (60%) 576 (62%) 
Total 820 102 922 
*Includes only those cases where the existence or absence of a prior record was 
mentioned. Does not include two cases of unknown gender.  
                                                                                                                      
 71. See supra Part II.D.6. 
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 With respect to other aggravating and mitigating factors, it seems 
reasonable to assume that they are at least implicitly taken into ac-
count in most cases. However, most published reports do not explic-
itly mention such factors. Although we have tabulated the ones that 
did, the results, set forth in Tables 10 and 11, need to be interpreted 
with care.  
 Overall, aggravating and mitigating factors were applied to men 
and women in proportions roughly equivalent to their proportions of 
the disciplined attorneys sample. Of all aggravating factors men-
tioned, 88% were applied to men and 12% to women. Of all mitigat-
ing factors mentioned, 87% were applied to men and 13% to women. 
 Some notable gender differences are discussed where applicable in 
Part IV, infra. Entirely apart from gender considerations, it is inter-
esting that mitigating factors (1161 total) were mentioned far more 
frequently than aggravating factors (745 total). 
TABLE 10 
Aggravating Factors Mentioned in Published Reports 
Aggravating Factor* No. Men  
(% of all men’s 
aggravating 
factors) 
No. Women 
(% of all 
women’s ag-
gravating 
factors) 
Total 
No. 
Pattern of Misconduct and/or Multiple 
Offenses 
168 (26%) 28 (31%) 196 
Has Substantial Experience as a Lawyer 102 (16%) 8 (9%) 110 
Deceptive Practices or Lack of Candor 
During Disciplinary Process 
80 (12%) 10 (11%) 90 
Self-serving, Selfish, and/or Dishonest 
Motive 
68 (10%) 5 (5%) 73 
Harm to Client 53 (8%) 11 (12%) 64 
No Remorse or Refusal to Acknowledge 
Wrongful Nature of Conduct 
50 (8%) 5 (5%) 55 
Indifference to Making Restitution 44 (7%) 11 (12%) 55 
Vulnerability of Victim or Prior Friend-
ship with Client 
33 (5%) 4 (4%) 37 
Conduct Harmed the Administration of 
Justice 
20 (3%) 7 (8%) 27 
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Aggravating Factor* No. Men  
(% of all men’s 
aggravating 
factors) 
No. Women 
(% of all 
women’s ag-
gravating 
factors) 
Total 
No. 
Other (illegal conduct or conduct involv-
ing moral turpitude, engaged in miscon-
duct after disciplinary counsel began in-
vestigation or while attorney was on 
probation, failure to comply with court 
order, attorney through special employ-
ment (state bar, district attorney) should 
have realized conduct was wrong, harm 
to people other than client, conduct in-
volved client trust account violations) 
  
36 (6%) 2 (2%) 38 
Total 654 91 745 
* Factors are nonexclusive; an attorney could be subject to more than one. Fac-
tors do not include existence of a prior disciplinary record, which was counted 
separately. 
TABLE 11 
Mitigating Factors Mentioned in Published Reports 
Mitigating Factor* No. Men (% 
of all men’s 
mitigating fac-
tors) 
No. Women (% 
of all women’s 
mitigating fac-
tors) 
Total 
No. 
Cooperated with Disciplinary Au-
thorities 
213 (21%) 21 (14%) 234 
Demonstrated Remorse 127 (13%) 14 (9%) 141 
Acted in Good Faith or Did Not Per-
sonally Profit 
94 (9%) 19 (13%) 113 
Restitution, Rehabilitation, Satis-
fied Conditions 
95 (9%) 10 (7%) 105 
Mental Health Problems (depres-
sion, bipolar, stress, schizophrenia, 
gambling addiction) 
84 (8%) 19 (13%) 103 
Provided Positive Character Wit-
nesses or References 
82 (8%) 9 (6%) 91 
Conduct Did Not Harm Client 52 (5%) 4 (3%) 56 
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Mitigating Factor* No. Men (% 
of all men’s 
mitigating fac-
tors) 
No. Women (% 
of all women’s 
mitigating fac-
tors) 
Total 
No. 
Other Health Conditions of Attor-
ney 
38 (4%) 10 (7%) 48 
Death, Illness of Close Family 
Member 
31 (3%) 12 (8%) 43 
Performs Community Service 34 (3%) 7 (5%) 41 
Alcohol or Drug Abuse 38 (4%) 2 (1%) 40 
Financial Problems 25 (2%) 7 (5%) 32 
Other Penalties or Sanctions Have 
Been Imposed 
22 (2%) 3 (2%) 25 
Other (divorce, child or elder care, 
damage to office, secretarial prob-
lems, military service, delay in pro-
ceeding, inexperience, retiring, re-
moteness in time of offense, sole 
practitioner) 
77 (8%) 12 (8%) 89 
Total** 1,012 149 1,161 
* Factors are non-exclusive; an attorney could have proffered more than one. 
Factors do not include absence of a prior disciplinary record, which was counted 
separately. 
** Does not include two cases of unknown gender. 
E.   Matters in Which Attorneys Committed Disciplinary Violations 
 As Table 12 shows, we were able to determine the types of 2103 
legal matters in which the attorneys in our sample violated a disci-
plinary rule. Note that this is not the same as determining this in-
formation for 2103 of the 3493 attorneys in our sample. Many of the 
reports list, with respect to a single attorney, several different legal 
matters in which the attorney is found to have violated a disciplinary 
rule. Thus, for example, if ten attorneys were each found to have ne-
glected five cases (say two criminal matters, two domestic relations 
matters, and a bankruptcy), that would be fifty legal matters in-
cluded in this tabulation, but only ten attorneys. 
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 Consistent with reports from many disciplinary agencies,72 the 
types of legal matters in which disciplinary violations were most of-
ten found in our sample were domestic relations (20%), personal in-
jury representing the plaintiff (19%), and criminal defense (14%). 
There were substantial gender differences in two of those categories. 
A much higher percentage of women (32%) than men (18%) commit-
ted a violation in domestic relations cases. In contrast, a much higher 
percentage of men (15%) than women (7%) committed a violation in 
criminal cases.  
TABLE 12 
Types of Legal Matters in Which Attorneys Committed  
Disciplinary Violations 
Type of Legal Matter 
 
 
Total
No. 
% of 
Total
 
No.
Men 
 
% of 
Men 
 
No. 
Wom
en 
 
% of 
Wom
en 
Domestic Relations 423 20% 337 18% 86 32% 
Personal Injury,  
Plaintiff-side* 
398 19% 357 19% 41 15% 
Criminal Defense 285 14% 267 15% 18 7% 
Wills, Probate, Trusts, 
Conservatorships 
212 10% 198 11% 14 5% 
General Civil Litigation, 
Individual Client,  
Plaintiff-side** 
208 10% 176 10% 32 12% 
Bankruptcy, Debtor Client 119 6% 99 5% 20 7% 
Real Estate Transaction, 
Individual Client 
87 4% 78 4% 9 3% 
                                                                                                                      
 72. For example, in Oklahoma in 2000, the largest percentage of all formal grievances 
filed involved criminal practice (23.61%) and family practice (20.74%). Oklahoma 2000 Re-
port, supra note 1. In Texas, “the criminal-defense area is by far the most prolific for com-
plaints, followed by family law and personal-injury law.” Jeffreys, supra note 20; see also 
Campbell & Kollman, supra note 15, at 234 (In 1998, the greatest number of complaints 
against lawyers were filed in the criminal, personal injury, and family law areas.). In Colo-
rado, the most common areas of “inquiries” in 2000 involved domestic relations (26%), civil 
(13%), and criminal (11%). CO. SUPREME COURT OFFICE OF ATTORNEY REGULATION COUN-
SEL, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT (2001) (on file with authors). In Oregon, the areas most likely to 
generate complaints were criminal (35%), domestic relations (15%), and litigation (9%). 
OREGON 2000 REPORT, supra note 10, at 19. Similar percentages existed in 1999. Id. at 20. 
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Type of Legal Matter 
 
 
Total
No. 
% of 
Total
 
No.
Men 
 
% of 
Men 
 
No. 
Wom
en 
 
% of 
Wom
en 
Employment Law,  
Plaintiff-side 
58 3% 46 3% 12 4% 
General Civil Litigation, 
Individual Client,  
Defendant- side** 
58 3% 48 3% 10 4% 
Immigration 46 2% 39 2% 7 3% 
Workers’ Compensation 44 2% 41 2% 3 1% 
Motor Vehicle Licensing 
and Violations, Including 
DUI 
32 2% 27 1% 5 2% 
All other† 133 6% 120 7% 13 5% 
Total 2,103  1,833  270  
* Including medical malpractice and wrongful death. 
** Not including the specific types of civil litigation listed separately in this ta-
ble. 
† Includes guardianships (28); general transactional (nonlitigation) work for in-
dividual clients (22); all representation of business entity clients, whether litiga-
tion (35), real estate (6), or general transactional work (24); social security (7); 
juvenile (4); bankruptcy representing the creditor (2); personal lawsuits filed by 
the disciplined attorney (3); personal injury representing the defendant (1); and 
attorney discipline (1). 
F.   Gender Was Not a Significant Predictor of  
Length of Term Suspension 
1.   Comparison of Means 
 Of those attorneys receiving a term suspension, the mean suspen-
sion length for men was about 1.5 months longer than the mean sus-
pension length for women. The difference, however, is not significant 
(Pr = 0.190): there is a 19.0% chance we would have observed this 
data if the null hypothesis (men and women receive suspensions of 
equal length) were true. Indeed, the median term suspension length 
for both genders was six months. 
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TABLE 13 
Term Suspension Length by Gender 
Gender Number Mean Term of 
Suspension 
(in months) 
Standard De-
viation 
Median Term 
of Suspension 
(in months) 
Men 887 11.48 13.909 6 
Women 142 9.87 11.742 6 
Total* 1,029 11.26 13.637 6 
* Does not include cases of unknown gender. 
2.   Regression 
 We wondered whether, as has been documented in studies of sen-
tencing of female criminal defendants,73 disciplinary authorities 
might mete out against female attorneys less severe sanctions than 
against similarly situated male attorneys.74 However, the regressions 
we were able to model from the available data suggest that gender is 
not a significant predictor of the length of term suspensions.  
 To analyze whether gender was a significant predictor of the se-
verity of a sanction, we used length of a term suspension as the de-
pendent variable, since it was the only linear variable (number of 
                                                                                                                      
 73. See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 298-302 (2001) (empirical 
study of 77,236 federal offenders sentenced under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 find-
ing that after controlling for the offense level, criminal history, district, and offense type, 
men received sentences of 5.5 more months, or 12% longer, than women, which is statisti-
cally significant at the .01 level; speculating that “judges observe important individual 
characteristics that an empirical study cannot consider” or that women are “treated pater-
nalistically in court”); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Struc-
tured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female 
Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
181, 185-90, 216-21 (1994) (reviewing literature and available data suggesting female 
criminal defendants generally receive lighter sentences than male criminal defendants; 
possible explanations include a “chivalry/paternalism” bias in women’s favor and judges’ 
desire not to separate mothers from their children as a result of incarceration). 
 74. Cf. Christine Rack, Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Pat-
terns in the Metrocourt Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 211, 256-57 (1999) (asserting 
that claimants of both genders concede more in mediation with female respondents than 
with male respondents). 
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months suspended).75 Thus, this analysis included only those cases 
that resulted in a term suspension.  
 In the first regression, we selected five independent variables: 
gender, a prior disciplinary sanction against the same attorney,76 
number of different types of violations committed by the attorney,77 
number of aggravating circumstances mentioned in the report, and 
number of mitigating circumstances mentioned in the report.78 Table 
14 shows the results. 
 There were 389 observations that contained information on all the 
selected variables. The R-Square of the model was 0.06922, meaning 
that the model explained about 7% of the variance in length of sus-
pension. This does not mean that the model was not meaningful: the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that the model is not sig-
nificant was less than 0.01%. 
 Perhaps the reason the R-Square of this model is relatively low is 
that the best predictor (probably) of a term suspension length—the 
circumstances of the particular violation—was not included as an in-
dependent variable in this model. We considered trying to rank the 
types of violations according to some standard of “seriousness,” but it 
seemed that evaluating, for example, incompetence as less “serious” 
than commingling was open to criticism.  
 The state in which the sanction was issued likely affects the term 
suspension length as well. There appear to be considerable differ-
ences across states in how “tough” their respective disciplinary tri-
bunals are.79 Even within the same state, similarly situated attor-
                                                                                                                      
 75. In theory, to make the full range of sanctions linear, it would be possible to assign 
some sort of scale to the sanctions to approximate their relative severity—for example, a 
disbarment could be scaled 1000, an indefinite suspension 800, a term suspension 500 plus 
the number of months, etc. We decided this would be too arbitrary. 
 76. Although a prior disciplinary record is one of the aggravating circumstances listed 
in the ABA standards (and lack thereof a mitigating circumstance), we coded this factor 
separately from aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally. See supra Part 
II.D.6. Observations in which the report mentions nothing about the presence or absence of 
a prior disciplinary record were excluded from this analysis. 
 77. For example, if an attorney was found to have handled two different matters in-
competently, and to have commingled funds in one of those matters (or in a third matter), 
that would be counted as two, not three, violations. 
 78. If a report mentioned neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, or explic-
itly said there were none, that observation was eliminated from this analysis. 
 79. For example, California had 163 disbarments of 449 reported disciplinary sanc-
tions in 2000 (36%), whereas New York had 108 disbarments of 237 reported disciplinary 
sanctions in 2000 (46%).  See supra tbl. 5, at 807 and infra tbl. 18, at 853. In particular, 
59% and 17% of New York and California lawyers, respectively, who were found to have 
mismanaged or misappropriated funds were disbarred. (Data on file with authors.) Indeed, 
there is probably enough data in our database for a separate study of the differences in 
punishments for the same offense across states, but it is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Cf. Daniel A. Vigil, Regulating In-House Counsel: A Catholicon or a Nostrum?, 77 MARQ. L. 
REV. 307 (1994) (comparing the disparate responses of the 50 states’ supreme courts to the 
question of whether an in-house attorney licensed in another state, but not in the forum 
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neys may be disciplined inconsistently.80 This may be, in part, a re-
sult of the failure of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanc-
tions to provide adequate guidelines for determining the length of a 
suspension.81 In other words, sheer arbitrariness undoubtedly ac-
counts for some of the suspension lengths. 
 That said, the model is still valid. The existence or absence of a 
prior disciplinary action against the same attorney, the number of 
different violations committed by the attorney, the number of aggra-
vating factors mentioned in the report, and the number of mitigating 
factors mentioned in the report were all highly significant predictors 
of the length of a term suspension. Gender, however, was not a sig-
nificant predictor. 
TABLE 14 
Regression Model No. 1 
Significance of Certain Variables in Predicting  
Length of Term Suspension 
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > │t│ 
Intercept 6.430154 1.770672 3.63 0.0003 
Gender -1.12707 1.883535 -0.60 0.5499 
Prior Record 3.196340 1.324111 2.41 0.0162 
No. Violation 
Types 
1.317133 0.440558 2.99 0.0030 
No. Aggra. Fac-
tors 
1.450383 0.499490 2.90 0.0039 
No. Mitig. Factors -0.79084 0.478702 -1.65 0.0993 
 The parameter estimate indicates the effect of the variable on 
term suspension length. For example, if an attorney had a prior dis-
ciplinary record, that increased the length of his or her suspension by 
an average of more than three months. For each additional type of 
violation the attorney was found to have committed, the length of the 
                                                                                                                      
state, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by rendering advice to the corporation in 
the forum state). 
 80. See, e.g., Campbell & Kollman, supra note 15, at 241 (concluding, after conducting 
random sample of Texas actions in 1998, that “the application of discipline was at best un-
even” and at worst, “essentially the same conduct yielded widely disparate treatment for 
the sanctioned lawyers”); Note, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Childress: Excessive Fo-
cus on Mitigating Factors in Attorney Misconduct Case Fails to Preserve Public Confidence 
in the Legal Profession, 61 MD. L. REV. 482, 490 (2002) (noting inconsistent application of 
mitigating factors in Maryland); John D. Fabian & Brian Reinthaler, Note, An Examina-
tion of the Uniformity (Or Lack Thereof) of Attorney Sanctions, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1059 (2001) (finding lack of uniformity in suspension lengths for perjury and false state-
ments in the District of Columbia, Florida, and Illinois); Michael Goldman, Note, Disci-
pline of McLendon and Discipline of Petersen: Adding Chaos to Confusion in Washington 
Legal Ethics, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 187 (1993/1994). 
 81. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 15, at 37-38. 
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suspension was increased by an average of about 1.3 months. For 
each aggravating factor, the suspension length grew by an average of 
about 1.5 months. For each mitigating factor, the suspension length 
decreased by almost one month (0.79 months). The effect of each of 
these four variables was statistically significant (Pr < 0.10).  Finally, 
the regression indicated that being a woman decreased the length of 
the suspension by an average of 1.1 months. However, this was not 
statistically significant (Pr = 0.55). 
 The second regression attempted to account more fully for the dif-
ferent types of violations committed, as these presumably have the 
most effect on term suspension length. In the second regression, we 
selected four of the independent variables used in the first regres-
sion—gender, a prior disciplinary sanction against the same attor-
ney, number of aggravating circumstances mentioned in the report,82 
and number of mitigating circumstances mentioned in the report—
and added each of the types of violations as sixteen additional inde-
pendent dummy83 variables. Table 15 shows the results.  
 The R-Square of the second model was 0.17471, meaning that the 
model explained about 17.5% of the variance in length of suspension. 
Again, the Pr of the model was less than 0.0001.  
 The second model also indicated that gender was not a significant 
predictor of term suspension length (Pr = 0.5498). Statistically sig-
nificant independent variables (Pr < 0.1) were the presence or ab-
sence of a prior disciplinary record, the total number of other aggra-
vating factors, the total number of mitigating factors, and the com-
mission of ethical violations involving the scope of representation, 
conflict of interest, misappropriation, fraud, criminal activity, or mis-
conduct in the disciplinary proceeding.  
 
TABLE 15 
Regression Model No. 2 
Significance of Certain Variables in Predicting Length of  
Term Suspension 
Variable Parame-
ter Esti-
mate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > │t│ 
Intercept 2.56 1.79 1.43 0.1538 
Gender -1.03 1.71 -0.60 0.5498 
                                                                                                                      
 82. If a report mentioned neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, or explic-
itly said there were none, that observation was eliminated from this analysis. 
 83. A dummy variable is 1 if relevant and 0 if not relevant. 
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Variable Parame-
ter Esti-
mate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > │t│ 
Prior Record** 3.62 1.29 2.8 0.0054 
Number of Aggravating Fac-
tors** 
1.28 0.49 2.63 0.0088 
Number of Mitigating Fac-
tors** 
-1.01 0.44 -2.30 0.0221 
Competence, Diligence -1.07 1.57 -0.68 0.4957 
Scope of Representation* 6.19 3.33 1.86 0.0637 
Communications with Client 1.60 1.66 0.96 0.3355 
Fees -0.21 1.52 -0.14 0.8904 
Confidentiality 11.40 8.39 1.36 0.1751 
Conflict of Interest** 4.67 1.96 2.38 0.0179 
Misappropriation** 5.53 1.34 4.12 <0.0001 
Improper Litigation Conduct -0.13 1.73 -0.07 0.9423 
Fraud** 4.91 1.36 3.61 0.0003 
Other Miscommunications 0.46 3.54 0.13 0.8956 
Law Firm Duties 1.19 1.76 0.68 0.5000 
Criminal** 5.73 2.12 2.70 0.0072 
Misconduct in Disciplinary 
Proceeding** 
4.53 1.36 3.33 0.0009 
State Bar Requirements -3.14 3.37 -0.93 0.3521 
Other** 7.29 2.98 2.45 0.0147 
Reciprocal Discipline -3.14 3.66 -0.86 0.3913 
* Significant at confidence level exceeding 90%. 
** Significant at confidence level exceeding 95%. 
IV.   EXPLORING POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES FOUND 
 Our study was designed primarily to quantify the incidence, type, 
and severity of attorney discipline by gender. We found that male at-
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torneys had a higher overall discipline rate and incurred more severe 
sanctions than female attorneys. But these findings alone do not il-
luminate what causes the differences.84 What follows is an explora-
tion, drawing upon some of the literature of sex differences generally, 
of possible explanations. 
A.   The Year 2000 Might Not Have Been Representative 
 Our figures for the percentage of all lawyers who incurred public 
discipline in 2000 are in line with the figures for 1996, 1998, and 
1999 reported by the ABA—around 0.3% to 0.4% of all lawyers.85 As 
to the percentage of disciplined attorneys by gender, it is difficult to 
refute the suggestion—without studying another year’s data—that 
the year 2000 could have been aberrational, because the ABA and 
most states do not maintain aggregate figures on attorney discipline 
by gender. Nonetheless, our data purport to reflect the entire popula-
tion of public attorney discipline matters for the year 2000—some 
3575 cases—and we know of nothing to suggest that the use of this 
particular year injects any type of bias. 
 We did, however, perform a spot-check of some readily available 
information in our files or on the internet for time periods other than 
the year 2000. Illinois, the only state that appears to compile aggre-
gate disciplinary figures by gender, reports that 12% of the lawyers 
disciplined in the year 2001 were female, while 30% of all Illinois at-
torneys were female.86 A quick count of the first names listed in some 
other annual reports revealed percentages roughly equivalent to 
those found in 2000 (Table 16).  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 84. See DANIEL LITTLE, VARIETIES OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 159-60, 177-79 (1991) (showing that a statistical relation-
ship does not, by itself, identify the causal mechanisms that underlie the relationship); Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-37 (2002) (describing 
difficulty of making descriptive or causal inferences from statistics). 
 85. Counting all duplicative “reciprocal” sanctions, but not including 147 private 
sanctions, our database included 3428 public sanctions in 2000, which would be approxi-
mately 0.4% of the 857,931 total lawyers reported in the 1995 American Bar Foundation 
study, see CARSON, supra note 28, at 23, and approximately 0.3% of the 1,147,125 total 
lawyers reported in a 1999 American Bar Association survey, see 1998-99 SURVEY, supra 
note 16, at 33. The latter survey reports 3906 public sanctions in 1999, id. at 37, or about 
0.3% of the total lawyers reported in that year. In 1998, there were 4146 public sanctions 
imposed on 1,098,203 total lawyers, or about 0.4%. See id. at 4, 8. The ABA reported 3777 
public sanctions imposed on 1,028,999 total lawyers in 1996, again about 0.4%. See 1996 
SURVEY, supra note 16, at 4, 9. 
 86. ILL. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM’N, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT  
(2001), available at http://www.iardc.org/new_page_2_copy1.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 
2004). 
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TABLE 16 
Gender of Disciplined Attorneys in Selected States for  
Periods Other than 200087 
State Period Cov-
ered 
Number of 
Disciplined 
Attorneys 
Number (%) 
Male  
Number (%) 
Female 
Georgia 5/1/98-
4/30/99 
86 70 (81.4%) 16 (18.6%) 
Indiana 1/1/01-
6/30/01 
32 29 (90.6%) 3 (9.4%) 
New Jersey 1/1/99-
12/31/99 
239 208 (87%) 22 (9.2%)* 
Oklahoma 1/1/02-
12/31/02 
16 14 (87.5%) 2 (12.5%) 
*There were also nine (3.8%) disciplined attorneys in New Jersey in 1999 whose 
gender could not be determined from their first name. 
B.   Disciplinary Agencies Might Treat Women Differently than Men 
 We found that men had a higher rate of discipline overall and 
were sanctioned more severely than women. Either or both of these 
might result from different treatment of men and women by discipli-
nary agencies.  
 The number of attorneys formally charged with disciplinary viola-
tions is a small fraction of the number of initial grievances or com-
plaints received by disciplinary agencies.88 Hypothetically, female at-
torneys could be the subject of initial grievances or complaints at a 
rate consistent with their proportion of the attorney population, but 
for some reason not become the subjects of a proportionate rate of 
                                                                                                                      
 87. The sources for this table are OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, STATE BAR OF GA., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2000-2001; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMM’N OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF IND. 11-14 (2000-2001); OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF N.J., STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 35-40 (2001); ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY COMM’N & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY TRIBUNAL, JAN. 
1, 2002 THROUGH DEC. 31, 2002, at http://www.okbar.org/gencounsel/ prcannual03.htm 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2004) (sources on file with authors). 
 88. For example, according to the ABA, in 1999 attorney disciplinary agencies re-
ceived 116,922 complaints, but only 6549 lawyers were publicly or privately sanctioned. 
1998-99 SURVEY, supra note 16, at 33, 37. The McKay Report reported in 1991 that many 
dismissed complaints either fail to allege unethical conduct or allege only minor infrac-
tions, yet still “state legitimate grounds for client dissatisfaction.” MCKAY REPORT, supra 
note 10, at xx. 
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formal disciplinary charges brought by disciplinary boards (we will 
call this the “charge rate”).89 
 Investigating whether the “charge rate” is lower for women is dif-
ficult because in most states, until an attorney is actually disciplined, 
his or her name is kept confidential.90 Further, there is little publicly 
available information on even an aggregate basis indicating the gen-
der of attorneys against whom grievances are filed (as opposed to 
discipline imposed).91 For example, the Oklahoma Professional Re-
sponsibility Commission reported that 1428 grievances (against 951 
attorneys) were filed in 2000.92 No gender statistics of the grievances 
were reported, nor were individual names published from which one 
might determine gender. 
 Illinois appears to be the only state that publicly reports, on an 
aggregate basis, the gender of attorneys against whom grievances 
are filed. In Illinois, 16% of the attorney disciplinary investigations 
docketed in 2000 were against female attorneys.93 However, only 
7.3% of the attorneys actually disciplined in Illinois in 2000 were fe-
male.94 Thus, the Illinois experience provides some evidence of a 
lower “charge rate” for female attorneys.  
 If complained-about women are formally charged at a rate lower 
than complained-about men, it might be because disciplinary board 
members have a “chivalry” bias in favor of women, such as has been 
postulated in the field of criminal sentencing.95 A chivalry bias might 
also help to explain why men are disbarred at a higher rate and have 
a longer mean term suspension than women. 
 Researchers in the criminal sentencing field cannot document the 
reasons women receive shorter sentences than men; they can only 
report the data and speculate about the causes. To the extent that 
                                                                                                                      
 89. Alternatively, female attorneys could be formally charged at a proportionate rate, 
but for some reason not ultimately disciplined at that rate, or disciplined privately. There 
is little publicly available data relevant to this proposition. Some dismissals of formal 
charges are reported, but we did not include dismissals in our database. Most states main-
tain attorney confidentiality unless discipline is actually imposed. 
 90. See supra note 10. 
 91. The ABA tracks the number of complaints received by states’ disciplinary agencies 
but does not report that information by attorney gender (and apparently does not request 
that the information be supplied that way). See, e.g., 1998-99 SURVEY, supra note 16, at 1-
4. 
 92. Oklahoma 2000 Report, supra note 1, at 727. 
 93. ILLINOIS 2000 REPORT, supra note 41, at 5. 
 94. See infra tbl.18, at p. 853.  
 95. See supra note 73; see also George A. Riemer, Discipline Task Force: What Is It? 
What Has It Been Doing? What Will Happen to Its Report?, 62 OR. ST. B. BULL. 23, 24-25 
(May 2002) (47.1% of almost 500 nonrandomly responding Oregon attorneys “felt that 
there was bias in the disciplinary system,” including, but not limited to, bias based on gen-
der). In contrast, some believe that disciplinary agencies are biased against minority at-
torneys. See Mark Hansen, Picking on the Little Guy, ABA J., Mar. 2003, at 30, 32 (also 
noting studies that have found no bias against minority attorneys). 
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they postulate a judicial “paternalism” towards women,96 the same 
might be true of disciplinary agencies (although one might quibble 
with the term “paternalism” when a significant percentage of judges 
and members of disciplinary boards are women). To the extent that 
researchers speculate that judges are reluctant to separate mothers 
from their children during incarceration,97 such a concern would not 
apply to disciplinary proceedings. In the end, Professor Mustard’s 
comment that the individual circumstances of each case cannot be re-
flected in statistical aggregation98 may be the primary explanation of 
the gender difference in disciplinary sanctions. But that begs the 
question of why women would present more generally favorable indi-
vidual circumstances. 
 Our data provides only qualified support for the chivalry hypothe-
sis. On the one hand, although men received, on average, slightly 
longer term suspensions than women, the difference was not statisti-
cally significant.99 In addition, the regressions on the length of term 
suspensions, discussed in Part III, supra, indicated that gender was 
not a significant predictor of suspension length. Thus, considering 
only those disciplined attorneys who received a term suspension, it 
does not appear that disciplinary boards are easier on women.  
 On the other hand, male attorneys were either disbarred or volun-
tarily resigned from the bar with charges pending at a much higher 
rate than female attorneys. The gender difference in the rate of these 
severe sanctions was highly significant even looking only at the 
population of disciplined attorneys rather than the overall attorney 
population.100 However, female attorneys received term suspensions 
at a significantly higher rate than male attorneys, given their respec-
tive proportions in the disciplined attorney population.101 It may be 
that in a situation in which a man would be likely to be disbarred, a 
disciplinary agency would be more likely to suspend a woman. 
 If women do have a lower “charge rate” than men, it may be be-
cause women who are the subject of grievances respond to discipli-
nary boards’ inquiries more promptly or persuasively than men. Dis-
ciplinary agencies are more likely to prosecute lawyers “who do not 
cooperate with the bar in the initial stage of its investigation,”102 and 
women may be more cooperative.103 Interestingly, however, our study 
indicates that of attorneys reported to have offered factors in mitiga-
                                                                                                                      
 96. See Mustard, supra note 73, at 298-303; Nagel & Johnson, supra note 73, at 185-
90, 216-21. 
 97. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 73, at 200-08. 
 98. Mustard, supra note 73, at 301-02. 
 99. See supra Part III.F.1. 
 100. See supra tbl.6, at p. 808. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Hansen, supra note 95, at 33. 
 103. See supra Part IV.H.2. 
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tion of discipline, a higher percentage of men (21%) than women 
(14%) were said to have cooperated with disciplinary authorities.104 
 As for relative persuasiveness, “research evidence in psychology 
and communication [indicates] that men are generally more persua-
sive than women in a number of situations.”105 Even if that “general” 
tendency does not hold true in the attorney discipline context, a very 
large percentage of complaints are dismissed with little investiga-
tion,106 suggesting that persuasiveness at the initial grievance stage 
may not be of critical importance.  
 A limited study of the effects of gender on civil case outcomes in 
New Mexico offers conflicting insights into the question of the gen-
ders’ relative persuasiveness. The study found that men receive 
slightly better outcomes as claimants in both adjudicated and medi-
ated small-claims cases than women.107 However, “Anglo” women ne-
gotiated (in mediation) slightly better outcomes as respondents in 
mediation than “Anglo” men in these cases.108 These mixed results 
could support, albeit weakly, the proposition that women fare better 
than men in informal, negotiated settings where they are in the posi-
tion of a defendant—such as, perhaps, interactions with a discipli-
nary agency after a grievance has been made but before formal 
charges are brought. 
C.   Men May Be More Likely to Engage in the Types of Legal Practice 
that Engender More Grievances 
 If men are more highly concentrated in those areas of law practice 
or types of law firms that generate more disciplinary complaints, it 
would not be surprising to see men disciplined more than women. 
Most states report that the largest percentage of formal grievances 
involve criminal practice, personal injury practice, or domestic rela-
tions practice.109 Our data confirmed this.110 Why these areas gener-
                                                                                                                      
 104. See supra tbl.11, at p. 816. 
 105. Michael Burgoon & Renee S. Klingle, Gender Differences in Being Influential 
and/or Influenced: A Challenge to Prior Explanations, in SEX DIFFERENCES AND 
SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 257, 271 (“[I]t is clear that men do have a great latitude to 
select among available means of persuasion; women do not enjoy that same freedom and 
must carefully select message strategies or risk being ineffective in persuasive attempts.”). 
 106. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 147 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 107. Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender 
on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
767, 778-84 (1996) (In a sample of small-claims cases in Albuquerque, New Mexico in 1990 
and 1991, Anglo male claimants had higher mean monetary outcome ratios—the total 
award or settlement divided by the total amount claimed—than Anglo women in both ad-
judicated and mediated cases, but the difference was only statistically significant in adju-
dicated cases, and much of the difference was due to case-specific factors.). 
 108. Id. at 778, 788. 
 109. See supra note 72. 
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ate the most grievances is unclear.111 Certainly, there may just be 
more such lawyers.112  
 There were some interesting gender differences in the limited in-
formation our data provided. Of the 2103 legal matters in our data-
base for which it was possible to classify the area of law involved, 
women handled 12.8% (270) and men handled 87.2% (1833) of the le-
gal matters. Thirty-two percent of the legal matters handled by 
women were in domestic relations, compared to only 18% of the legal 
matters handled by men.113 In contrast, 15% of the legal matters 
handled by men were in criminal defense, compared to only 7% of the 
legal matters handled by women. Finally, 19% of the matters han-
dled by men were in personal injury, compared to 15% of the matters 
handled by women. 
 When these three categories are combined, however, the gender 
differences disappear. Fifty-two percent of matters handled by men 
and 54% of matters handled by women were in domestic relations, 
personal injury, or criminal defense.  
 Nonetheless, our data does not show whether, as an absolute mat-
ter, men or women practice in these three “problem” areas more. 
Thus, we cannot say whether men practice more frequently in “prob-
lem” areas, leading to a higher rate of discipline. 
 Attorneys in criminal defense, family law, and personal injury are 
more likely to engage in private practice as a solo practitioner or with 
a small law firm.114 Such lawyers are generally less affluent than 
corporate lawyers, causing some to speculate that they might be 
                                                                                                                      
 110. See supra tbl.12, at p. 818 (Of matters handled by disciplined lawyers in 2000 for 
which information was available, 20% were in domestic relations, 19% in personal injury, 
and 14% in criminal defense.). 
 111. Cf. ABA MALPRACTICE PROFILE, supra note 3, at 4 (“Due to a lack of demographic 
information,” the ABA warns that it cannot determine whether any particular area of legal 
practice, such as personal injury work, generates a disproportionate number of malpractice 
claims.). 
 112. See, e.g., Darcy & Payton, supra note 2, at 3419 (survey of Oklahoma attorneys 
shows most commonly-identified “principal areas of practice” are personal injury (34.58%), 
estate planning and probate (33.28%), real property (33.12%), family law (31.83%), busi-
ness litigation (24.19%), and criminal law (23.86%)); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: 
No Lawyer or Client Is Safe, 47 FLA. L. REV. 1, 50-52 (1995) (While real estate and per-
sonal injury work account for almost 60% of Florida legal malpractice claims, 82% of Flor-
ida lawyers list themselves as practicing in those areas, leading the author to conclude 
that “there is no particular area that appears to be more prone to generating legal mal-
practice claims.”). 
 113. See supra tbl.12, at p. 818. 
 114. Criminal law, however, is also the domain of prosecutors and public defenders. 
Numerous commentators have documented the rarity with which prosecutors are disci-
plined, as compared with private attorneys. See, e.g., Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without 
A Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory 
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833 (1997); Zacharias, supra note 15, at 750-55 
(“[M]ost discipline occurs in cases involving the private civil bar.”).  
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more likely “to cut some corners.”115 Critics of the attorney discipli-
nary system have also suggested a general “permissiveness” on the 
part of disciplinary boards in favor of “the wealthy and well-known 
lawyers”116 and against “anti-establishment lawyers.”117  
 The individual clients that solo and small-firm lawyers serve may 
be more likely to initiate complaints than corporate clients,118 per-
haps owing to the searing personal consequences of these cases, par-
ticularly criminal and child custody litigation. Indeed, the twelve 
most prevalent types of legal matters occurring in our study were 
matters overwhelmingly involving individual clients: domestic rela-
tions, personal injury, criminal defense, wills, and the like.119 
 Clients, however, do not initiate all attorney disciplinary com-
plaints.120 Judges, opposing counsel, opposing parties, third parties, 
state bar associations, and even attorneys themselves initiate a sig-
nificant portion.121  
 Some evidence suggests that disciplinary actions are instituted 
against solo and small-firm practitioners more frequently than 
                                                                                                                      
 115. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 6, at 33 (“Elite lawyers could [in the past] afford to 
brush aside temptations that were often overwhelming to hungrier low-status lawyers.”); 
SHARON TISHER ET AL., BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIX BAR 
ASSOCIATIONS 103 (1977) (describing, without ascribing to, theory that “[s]crapping for a 
living, handling small estates, lacking the supervision of senior partners, this attorney 
presumably succumbs to temptation”); Ramos, supra note 112, at 6-7 (citations omitted). 
 116. TISHER ET AL., supra note 115, at 105; see also Levin, supra note 15, at 11 n.44 
(collecting sources); REPORT OF THE OREGON STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM TASK 
FORCE, JULY 15, 2002, at http://www.osbar.org/barnews/monthly/disciplinary.html (detail-
ing almost 500 non-randomly responding Oregon attorneys; 47.1% felt there was bias in 
the attorney disciplinary system, and of those, 31.5% felt that the bias was based on the 
size of the lawyer’s firm). But see id. (Regarding Minority Report #1, although there is a 
perception that the disciplinary process is not fair to small firm lawyers and solo practitio-
ners, it is a misperception.). 
 117. Martin Garbus & Joel Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment: They Sit in Judg-
ment, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 54 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976). 
 118. See Hansen, supra note 95, at 34 (quoting a disciplinary defense attorney who be-
lieves “the system is too dependent on client complaints, the overwhelming majority of 
which come from the clients of solo and small-firm practitioners”); TISHER ET AL., supra 
note 115, at 104 (“The small-time civil or criminal practitioner does a high volume practice 
with a clientele generally not knowledgeable in the ways of the law and distrusting of law-
yers.” Further, the “[t]rue victims of unethical corporate law practice [the stockholder, the 
consumer, and the general public] . . . are rarely in a position to protest.”). 
 119. See supra tbl.12, at p. 818. 
 120. See, e.g., OREGON 2000 REPORT, supra note 10, at app. A (clients initiated 723 of 
1404, or 50%, of complaints in Oregon in 2000); id. at app. B (clients initiated 733 of 1353 
complaints in 1999). In Rhode Island, of the 161 formal complaints initiated in 2000, 131 
(81%) were initiated by clients. 26TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF R.I., JAN. 1, 2000 THROUGH DEC. 31, 2000 (2001), at tbl.3 (on file with 
authors). 
 121. E.g., Favaloro v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 13 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App. 2000) 
(opposing counsel); OREGON 2000 REPORT, supra note 10, at app. A (opposing parties and 
opposing counsel initiated 23% of complaints in Oregon in 2000); In re Ailshie, 532 S.E.2d 
607, 608 (S.C. 2000) (self-reported complaint). 
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against other types of attorneys.122 Of attorneys in private practice, 
women are slightly more likely than men to be solo practitioners.123 
But as a whole, women are less likely than men to be in private prac-
tice.124 It is doubtful that the proportion of women in private practice 
or solo practice has much, if any, effect on the rate at which female 
lawyers are disciplined.  
 Finally, it is possible that more female attorneys than male attor-
neys work part-time,125 which might cause a proportionate reduction 
in disciplinary complaints. While this may be true, it is estimated 
that only 3%-4% of all lawyers work part-time.126 In addition, the po-
tential effect of more female part-time lawyers would probably be off-
set by the fact that 6% of male lawyers, and only 3% of female law-
yers, are retired or inactive.127  
D.   The Average Age of Female Attorneys Is Less than that of  
Male Attorneys, and Age Might Correlate Positively with  
the Incidence of Discipline 
 States that record the practice experience of disciplined attorneys 
indicate that a disproportionate number of disciplined attorneys have 
been in practice more than 25 years.128 Female attorneys on average 
                                                                                                                      
 122. See Rhode, supra note 15, at 548 (citing a survey of 1981-82 disciplinary cases in 
three states which found that about 80% of cases imposing public discipline involved solo 
practitioners); Hansen, supra note 95, at 32. In contrast, two studies of legal malpractice 
claims have found that solo practitioners were subject to malpractice claims at a dispropor-
tionately low rate. Ramos, supra note 112, at 42; ABA MALPRACTICE PROFILE, supra note 
3, at 8 (finding that in 1999, solo practitioners made up 47% of law firms but accounted for 
only 35% of malpractice claims). If disciplinary actions followed the same pattern, that 
might account for part of the lower rate in disciplinary actions against women. Professor 
Ramos questioned that assumption, Ramos, supra note 112, at 49-50 (“[L]awyers who face 
malpractice claims do not disproportionately face disciplinary complaints or disciplinary 
sanctions.”), but also noted that the “worst” lawyers—measured either by those who faced 
two or more legal malpractice claims between 1988 and 1994 or by those who generated 
the highest-dollar payments on such claims—were disbarred at a higher rate than Florida 
lawyers in general. Id. at 53, 54 n.323, 58. 
 123. See, e.g., CARSON, supra note 28, at 25 (Of private practitioners, 45.9% of male 
lawyers and 50.3% of female lawyers were solo practitioners in 1995.); RHODE, supra note 
33, at 23 (noting that 36% of female lawyers are in solo practice, as opposed to 34% of male 
lawyers). 
 124. CARSON, supra note 28, at 10 (Seventy-five percent of male lawyers and 71% of 
female lawyers were in private practice in 1995.). 
 125. See, e.g., Leslie Anne Miller, Women in the Legal Profession: Where Are We Now?, 
25 PA. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 20, 21 (2002 survey of Pennsylvania Bar Association com-
mittee finding that an “overwhelmingly majority of part-time attorneys were women”). 
 126. See Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives For Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2207, 
2213 (2002); Jacquelyn H. Slotkin, Should I Have Learned to Cook? Interviews with Women 
Lawyers Juggling Multiple Roles, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 147, 154 (2002); Joan C. Wil-
liams, Canaries in the Mine: Work/Family Conflict and the Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2221 (2002). 
 127. CARSON, supra note 28, at 10 (1995 figures). 
 128. See, e.g., Oklahoma 2000 Report, supra note 1, at 729 (23.67% of formal griev-
ances in 2000 filed against attorneys who have been in practice 26 years or more; only 
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tend to be younger and less experienced than male attorneys. In 
1995, only 6% of the lawyers who had been in practice more than 25 
years were women, and the median age for American male and fe-
male lawyers was 45 and 37 respectively.129 
 Our study indicates that disciplined attorneys on average are 
older than attorneys generally, and male disciplined attorneys on av-
erage are older than female disciplined attorneys. As Table 17 
shows,130 the median age of the 684 disciplined attorneys in 2000 
whose ages were available131 was 50 for men and 46 for women. The 
difference in disciplined attorneys’ median age by gender is statisti-
cally significant.132 In addition, of those attorneys in our study for 
whom the disciplinary agency explicitly considered aggravating fac-
tors in determining punishment, a much higher percentage of the 
men (16%) than the women (9%) were said to have had substantial 
experience as a lawyer.133 
TABLE 17 
Age (in Years) of Disciplined Attorneys in 2000 
 Number Mean Median 
Men 581 50.6 50 
Women 103 46.4 46 
 The finding that disciplined attorneys are older than average con-
trasts sharply with several studies of business ethics that have found 
that business students and executives become more ethical as they 
age.134 Moreover, an empirical study of legal malpractice actions in 
                                                                                                                      
8.88% of formal grievances filed against attorneys in practice 5 years or less); cf. ABEL, su-
pra note 106, at 154 (study of malpractice claims against California lawyers in the early 
1980s showing that “lawyers with more than ten years of experience constitute 57.7 per-
cent of the profession but are the object of 65.5 percent of claims”) (citation omitted). 
 129. CARSON, supra note 28, at 5. 
 130. See infra, tbl. 17, at p. 833. 
 131. The attorney’s age was available in only 684 of the 3493 cases (excluding recipro-
cal discipline cases) in our database. Only California and Texas regularly include the at-
torney’s age in the disciplinary report. Five cases in which the attorney’s gender was inde-
terminate were excluded from this analysis. 
 132. With a critical value of 1.97 at the 95% confidence level, the t statistic is 5.07 (Pr < 
0.0001). 
 133. See supra tbl.10, at p. 815. 
 134. See John H. Barnett & Marvin J. Karson, Managers, Values, and Executive Deci-
sions: An Exploration of the Role of Gender, Career Stage, Organizational Level, Function, 
and the Importance of Ethics, Relationships and Results in Managerial Decision-Making, 8 
J. BUS. ETHICS 747, 755 (1989); John H. Barnett & Marvin J. Karson, Personal Values and 
Business Decisions: An Exploratory Investigation, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 371, 375, 377 (1987); 
Barbara Libby & Vincent Agnello, Ethical Decision Making and the Law, 26 J. BUS. ETH-
ICS 223, 230 (2000) (“In general the younger student with less work experience took an ex-
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Florida found “[t]hat lawyers who face legal malpractice claims do 
not necessarily tend to be younger or older, but generally are propor-
tionate to the lawyer population of Florida.”135 
 What could explain the seemingly counterintuitive finding that 
older attorneys have more discipline problems?  True, younger attor-
neys are required to take ethics in law school136 and pass the Multi-
state Professional Responsibility Exam, but that is surely an inade-
quate explanation.137 Alternatively, alcoholism is a prominent theme 
in attorney discipline cases, and one study found that the proportion 
of “problem drinkers” among lawyers increased after more than 20 
years of law practice.138 In addition, “[m]en were more likely than 
women to develop into problem drinkers.”139 
 Interestingly, although the absolute incidence of discipline is posi-
tively correlated with age, it does not appear that age is positively 
correlated with severity of sanction. We did not correlate age with 
type of sanction generally, but we did correlate age with length of 
term suspension. Of the 254 observations in our database that in-
cluded both the attorney’s age and a term suspension length, there is 
a very slight (.068) positive correlation between age and length of 
term suspension, but it is not statistically significant (Pr = 0.282). In 
addition, a regression run only on observations from the state of Cali-
fornia included age as one of the independent variables.140 Age was 
not found to be a significant predictor of length of term suspension.141 
                                                                                                                      
tremely utilitarian view. They would do anything to make a sale.”); Diana C. Robertson & 
Erin Anderson, Control System and Task Environment Effects on Ethical Judgment: An 
Exploratory Study of Industrial Salespeople, 4 ORG. SCIENCE 617, 637 (1993) (study of 
ethical judgment of industrial salespeople finding that “older, more experienced salespeo-
ple and sales managers are less likely to suggest cutting ethical corners”); Durwood Rueg-
ger & Ernest W. King, A Study of the Effect of Age and Gender Upon Student Business Eth-
ics, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 179, 182-84 (1992) (citing survey of 2196 business students finding 
older students gave significantly “more ethical” responses to eight out of ten hypothetical 
ethical business dilemmas).  
 135. Ramos, supra note 112, at 44. However, the same study also noted that older and 
more experienced lawyers accounted for a disproportionate number of the “top 100 worst 
lawyers” in terms of dollars paid out in legal malpractice claims. Id. at 57 nn.358-59. 
 136. ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 302(b) (2003) available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter3.html (last visited May 2, 2004). 
 137. See ABEL, supra note 106, at 143 (citing empirical studies showing that such re-
quired courses have no effect on conduct); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal and Law School Mal-
practice: Confessions of a Lawyer’s Lawyer and Law Professor, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 882-84 
(1996) (calling the ethics course “the most hated course in the [law school] curriculum”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 138. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and 
Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSCYHIATRY 233, 241 (1990) 
(finding that 18% of lawyers who had practiced 2 to 20 years were problem drinkers, com-
pared to 25% of lawyers who had practiced more than 20 years). 
 139. Id. at 242. 
 140. The other independent variables were gender, the existence of a prior disciplinary 
sanction, the number of violations, the number of aggravating factors, and the number of 
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E.   Women Might Have a Lower Substance Abuse Rate, and Women 
Might Be More Likely to Seek Professional Help for Depression 
 In 143 of the 3493 cases (exclusive of reciprocals) in our database, 
the disciplined attorney offered, as a mitigating factor, alcoholism, 
drug abuse, depression, and other mental health issues.142 Although 
these findings do not lend strong support to the oft-asserted claim 
that alcoholism frequently contributes to attorney discipline,143 it is 
possible that the issue is unspoken in many cases. Assuming that al-
coholism does often coincide with discipline, the incidence of sub-
stance abuse is higher in men than women, although the gap may 
narrow as female attorneys age.144 Our data, however, does not sug-
gest that alcohol abuse contributes to attorney discipline enough to 
make any possible gender difference in alcohol abuse rates an impor-
tant factor in the gender difference in discipline rates. 
 Conversely, women suffer from depression at a higher rate than 
men.145 Of attorneys in our study who were reported to have offered 
mitigating factors, a higher percentage of women (13%) than men 
(8%) mentioned mental health problems.146 If depression contributes 
to disciplinary problems, the higher rate of male discipline is the op-
posite of what one might expect. Perhaps women are quicker to real-
ize they are in trouble and are less embarrassed about seeking help 
from either professional or informal sources. Some social science re-
search suggests this.147 Other researchers suggest that severe de-
                                                                                                                      
mitigating factors. There were 176 observations containing each of these variables. The R 
Square of this model was 0.157. 
 141. The p-value of the age variable was 0.36. In addition, the p-value for gender was 
0.675. 
 142. See supra tbl.11, at p. 816. According to one author in 1997, “lawyers are cur-
rently experiencing a significantly higher level of depression (19%) and substance abuse 
(15-18%) than individuals in other professions (among the general population, only 3-9% 
are depressed, and only 10-13% are chemically dependent).” Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know 
Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professional-
ism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (1997) (citations omitted); see also Benjamin et al., su-
pra note 138, at 240-41 (finding higher rates of depression and alcohol abuse in attorneys 
in Washington state than in the general population, but lower incidence of cocaine abuse); 
Todd Goren & Bethany Smith, Note, Depression as a Mitigating Factor in Lawyer Disci-
pline, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1081 (2001) (stating that alcoholism is higher in attorneys 
than in population generally, and depression likely is the reason) (citations omitted).  
 143. See ABA COMM’N ON IMPAIRED ATTORNEYS, AN OVERVIEW OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1991); Benjamin et al., supra note 138, at 243; Na-
thaniel S. Currall, Note, The Cirrhosis of the Legal Profession–-Alcoholism as an Ethical 
Violation or Disease Within the Profession, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 741 (1999).  
 144. See Benjamin et al., supra note 138 at 243 (“Statistically fewer of new Washington 
female attorneys reported alcohol problems than did the Washington men.”). 
 145. See id. at 242; Douglas Eby, Gender and Brain Imaging, at http://talentdevelop.com/ 
gender.html (last visited May 2, 2004) (“The incidence of female depression is usually 
found to be twice as high as the rate for men . . . .”). 
 146. See supra tbl.11, at p. 816. 
 147. See Laura K. Guerrero & Reneé L. Reiter, Expressing Emotion: Sex Differences in 
Social Skills and Communicative Responses to Anger, Sadness, and Jealousy, in SEX 
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pression is a precursor of alcohol abuse, and as the female attorney 
population ages, the incidence of alcoholism among women lawyers 
may rise.148 
 But our data indicate more depression in female disciplined law-
yers than in male disciplined lawyers. Any effect this difference 
might have on discipline rates would probably be to increase, not de-
crease the female rate, and hence is of little use in explaining the 
contrary finding here. 
F.   To the Extent that Ethical Violations Involve Monetary Gain, 
Female Attorneys Might Be Less Motivated by Monetary  
Gain than Male Attorneys 
 As an observer of the attorney disciplinary gender gap in Texas 
put it, “It could be that women are less greedy.”149 In fact, several 
studies have found differences between male and female law stu-
dents’ expressed motivations for attending law school. For example, 
“male law students are consistently more likely than female law stu-
dents to admit that a desire to make money motivated their decision 
to enter the field of law.”150 An unpublished study of law students at 
the University of Michigan from 1976-1979 showed that “[w]omen 
law students express much stronger preferences than men to work in 
substantive areas catering to personal client needs and much less in-
terest in becoming corporate lawyers.”151 To be sure, female law stu-
                                                                                                                      
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 344 (finding that “[i]n response to sad-
ness, women report seeking more social support than men,” and “men report engaging in 
more dangerous behavior than women”) 
 148. Benjamin et al., supra note 138, at 243. 
 149. Jeffreys, supra note 20. 
 150. Don S. Anderson et al., Conservatism in Recruits to the Professions, 9 AUSTL. & 
N.Z. J. SOC. 42, 43 (1973) (study of students in professional schools, including law, finding 
that “Status Concern [concern for security, prestige, and wealth], as an orientation, is more 
common among men than women students while a Professional Orientation [attraction to 
the intrinsic features of the profession] is more common among women”); Daicoff, supra 
note 142, at 1360, (citing Taber et al., supra note 3, at 1238 (38.7% of male students, com-
pared to 20.6% of female students, reported making money was an incentive for going to 
law school)); Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 612 
(1973) (finding that 54.7% of women law students surveyed said that financial rewards 
were not important to their decision to enter law school, while only 13.6% of male law stu-
dents surveyed said that financial rewards were not important to the decision); see also 
Michael Betz et al., Gender Differences in Proclivity for Unethical Behavior, 8 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 321, 322 (1989) (in survey of 213 business students, 14.6% of men, versus 1.8% of 
women, gave “money and power” as career goals at age 40). But see CYNTHIA FUCHS 
EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 37-42 (University of Illinois Press 1993) (1981) (finding men and 
women had similar motivations to attend law school); James J. White, Women in the Law, 
65 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1069-70 (1967) (reporting, with numerous qualifications, that 
30.4% of female lawyers surveyed indicated that “good remuneration” was a “very impor-
tant” reason they went to law school, while only 14.9% of the male lawyers said it was 
“very important”). 
 151. ABEL, supra note 106, at 96 (citation omitted); see also Maury Landsman & Ste-
ven P. McNeel, Do Women Lose Their Idealism in Law School? Gender, Moral Judgment 
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dents may just be saying what they think is more acceptable to the 
listener.152 
 Although weak evidence in either direction, our data on aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors produces interesting findings in this re-
gard. In cases where disciplinary agencies explicitly considered ag-
gravating factors, a self-serving, selfish, or dishonest motive was 
mentioned more frequently in connection with the men (10%) than 
the women (5%).153 Where attorneys explicitly proffered mitigating 
factors, more women (13%) than men (9%) were said to have acted in 
good faith or did not personally profit from the wrongdoing.154  
G.   Women May Be More Cautious as a Result of  
Perceived Discrimination 
 Female lawyers around the country report a significant incidence 
of gender-based discrimination and incivility against them by judges, 
court personnel, other lawyers, and clients.155 It has been suggested 
that some differences attributed to gender should more accurately be 
attributed to disparity in power and status.156 Put another way, 
“women have a much narrower band width of socially acceptable be-
                                                                                                                      
and Preference for [Certain] Public Interest Law Practice (unpublished working draft, on 
file with authors) (In three-year study of University of Minnesota law students, beginning 
female law students ranked the importance of certain public interest jobs significantly 
higher than beginning male law students. In the second year the difference disappeared, 
but began to show signs of reappearance in the third year.). 
 152. Daicoff, supra note 142, at 1361 (“[A]ctual motives for both men and women may 
not differ substantially, but what is socially acceptable for them to report may differ.”). 
 153. See supra tbl.10, at p. 815. 
 154. See supra tbl.11, at p. 816. 
 155. See, e.g., MARCIA CLARK, WITHOUT A DOUBT 117, 147-48, (1997) (“I know that I 
have to be tougher and better than the guys I work with.” In O.J. Simpson murder trial, 
judge addressed defense lawyers as “Mr. Cochran” and “Mr. Shapiro,” and addressed lead 
prosecutor as “Marcia.”); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 38-40 (2000); 
Lilia M. Cortina et al.,  What’s Gender Got to Do with It? Incivility in the Federal Courts, 
27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235 (2002); Lynn S. Glasser, Survey of Female Litigators: Dis-
crimination by Clients Limits Opportunities, in THE WOMAN ADVOCATE: EXCELLING IN THE 
90’S, at 59, 66-69 (Jean Maclean Snyder & Andrea Barmash Greene eds., 1996); Sandy 
Mastro, Courtroom Bias: Gender Discrimination Against Pregnant Litigators, 8 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 155 (2001).  For a partial listing of the reports published by task 
forces that have studied gender bias in more than thirty states and other jurisdictions, see 
Judith L. Maute, Writings Concerning Women in the Legal Profession, 1982-2002, 38 
TULSA L. REV. 167, 176-77 (2002), and Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of 
Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 4 
n.5 (1996). 
 156. See Elizabeth Aries, Gender Differences in Interaction: A Reexamination, in SEX 
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 72-73 (citing studies finding, among other 
things, that “[h]igh-status and powerful individuals have been found to interrupt more 
than low-status, less powerful individuals,” that “many of the characteristics attributed to 
women—interpersonal sensitivity, politeness, use of ‘women’s language’ (e.g., tag ques-
tions, qualifications of speech), and so on—are found more often in low-status than in high-
status individuals,” and that “[p]eople mitigate their requests when speaking to superi-
ors”). 
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havior than do men in this society.”157 Perhaps perceiving that they 
are under greater scrutiny, or are likely to get less sympathy, female 
lawyers may be more careful to play by the rules. 
H.   Due to Innate and/or Socialized Differences, Women May Be Less 
Likely than Men to Do Things that Make Clients and  
Others Angry Enough to File a Grievance 
 We now arrive at the core question: Are the values and behavior 
of men and women just different? Research on sex and gender158 dif-
ferences in behavior offers biological or physiological explanations 
and social or cultural explanations.159  
1.   Biological Differences 
 To begin with a clear biological difference, men have generally 
higher testosterone levels than women,160 and testosterone is associ-
ated with increased aggressive behavior: 
[T]hroughout the world, men fight more often than women, get ar-
rested for violent crimes more often, [and] shout insults at each 
other more often . . . . Moreover, the highest incidence of violence, 
as measured by crime statistics, is in men 15 to 25 years old, who 
have the highest levels of testosterone in the blood. . . . Among 
men of the same age, those with higher testosterone levels have, 
on average, slightly higher rates of violent activities and crimes 
than do other men.161 
                                                                                                                      
 157. Burgoon & Klingle, supra note 105, at 262-63 (citing studies on “language expec-
tancy theory,” or “cultural and sociological expectations about language behaviors that 
subsequently affect their acceptance or rejection of persuasive messages”). 
 158. The literature sometimes distinguishes between “sex” differences, which are “at-
tributed to biology,” and “gender” differences, which result from “a social, symbolic con-
struction that expresses the meanings a society confers on biological sex.” Julia T. Wood & 
Kathyn Dindia, What’s the Difference? A Dialogue About Differences and Similarities Be-
tween Women and Men, in SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 19-20; cf. 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 159. See, e.g., Laura K. Guerrero & Reneé L. Reiter, Expressing Emotion: Sex Differ-
ences in Social Skills and Communicative Responses to Anger, Sadness, and Jealousy, in 
SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 322-26; Lynda M. Sagrestano et al., 
Theoretical Approaches to Understanding Sex Differences and Similarities in Conflict Be-
havior, in SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 288-91.  
 160. See JAMES W. KALAT, BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 303 (6th ed. 1998); cf. Anita 
Sharpe, Spit Testing May Be Hard to Swallow in the Workplace, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 
1993, at A1 (citing study indicating women have about one-fifth the amount of testosterone 
in their saliva as men, and also indicating attorneys in general have a higher-than-average 
testosterone level). 
 161. KALAT, supra note 160, at 333 (citations omitted); see also ALLAN MAZUR & LEON 
S. ROBERTSON, BIOLOGY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 56 (1972) (“In general, males are more ag-
gressive than females. . . . ‘Among adults, men commit more homicides, more suicides, and 
are arrested more frequently for assault and battery. In adolescence, male delinquency is 
far more frequently aggressive than is female delinquency. . . .’ The difference is fairly gen-
eral across cultures.”) (citations omitted); DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE 
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 In addition, studies have consistently found that women are bet-
ter decoders and encoders of nonverbal communication, such as facial 
expressions, body language, and vocal cues.162 Women’s superiority in 
this regard has been found to be fairly constant across ages and cul-
tures, suggesting that biological rather than environmental factors 
are at work.163 Explanations range from “sex differences in brain lat-
eralization”164 to women’s relatively limited number of reproductive 
opportunities compared to men’s, giving rise to a greater genetic need 
for women to successfully parent their offspring.165 
2.   Social Science Research on Gender Differences Generally 
 Women are—perhaps stereotypically—perceived to be better com-
municators than men.166 For example, a recent study concluded that 
female primary-care physicians engage in more “patient-centered” 
communication than male primary-care physicians.167 Similarly, 
studies of gender differences in “comforting strategies” indicate that 
women are more likely than men to use “person-centered” comforting 
strategies in response to a distressed individual, and that both men 
and women rate “highly person-centered messages as more sensitive” 
                                                                                                                      
CLASSES: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 69-70 (1991) (women com-
mit fewer crimes than men relative to their proportion in the population). 
 162. See, e.g., JUDITH A. HALL, NONVERBAL SEX DIFFERENCES: COMMUNICATION ACCU-
RACY AND EXPRESSIVE STYLE 27 (1984); Judith A. Hall, How Big Are Nonverbal Sex Differ-
ences? The Case of Smiling and Sensitivity to Nonverbal Cues, in SEX DIFFERENCES AND 
SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 158-59. 
 163. See Peter A. Andersen, Researching Sex Differences Within Sex Similarities: The 
Evolutionary Consequences of Reproductive Differences, in SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMI-
LARITIES, supra note 4, at 86-89 (citations omitted); cf. KALAT, supra note 160, at 136 (“In a 
part of the temporal cortex important for language functioning, women have a greater den-
sity of neurons per volume.”) (citation omitted). Other scholars believe that “the mecha-
nisms underlying most behaviors likely have both biological and sociocultural compo-
nents.” Sagrestano et al., supra note 159, at 290 (citations omitted). 
 164. Andersen, supra note 163, at 89 (“[M]en have more specialized, lateralized brain 
functions, whereas women have more symmetrical, integrated brain functions . . . sug-
gest[ing] that the more efficient communication between the brain hemispheres of women 
enable logical, verbal information to be coordinated with nonverbal information to produce 
greater intuition and social sensitivity.”) (citations omitted); see also Joel Hughes, Brain 
Research Finds Gender Link: Med School Team Discovers Sexes Think Differently, YALE 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 16, 1995. 
 165. Andersen, supra note 163, at 89 (citations omitted). 
 166. It is a mystery why women are not more persuasive than men.  See supra note 
105. 
 167. Debra L. Roter et. al., Physician Gender Effects in Medical Communication: A 
Meta-analytic Review, 288 JAMA 756 (2002) (surveying, among other things, twenty-six 
prior empirical studies relating physician gender to physician-patient communication dur-
ing medical visits, and concluding that “[f]emale primary care physicians engage in more 
communication that can be considered patient centered,” including more questioning, 
counseling, exploration of emotional concerns, and statements of empathy and encourage-
ment). See also Burgoon & Kingle, supra note 105, at 264 (citing several studies finding 
that female physicians “use more affiliative behaviors than their male counterparts”). 
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than messages that tend to deny or ignore the other’s feelings.168 One 
study found that about three-fourths of those surveyed, of both gen-
ders, would rather receive emotional support from a female friend 
than a male friend.169 In another study of “goals when dealing with 
an upset person,” both men and women “assigned significantly 
greater priority to affective goals [such as helping the other person 
‘work through his or her feelings’ or blow off steam] than to instru-
mental goals [such as solving the problem or giving advice].”170  
 Women may, on the whole, be better listeners and easier to be 
around. At least fifteen studies indicate that women smile more than 
men in social interaction.171 Men and women also tend to use lan-
guage differently, with results such as this: 
[P]urely on the basis of communicators’ language samples, women 
and men both perceive female communicators to be of a higher so-
cial status and more literate, as well as nicer and more beautiful, 
than males. However, both [men and women] rated males as 
stronger and more aggressive [judging from their language sam-
ples].172 
One study contends that “a relatively large percentage of men are 
unwilling to change their attitudes and/or behaviors regardless of the 
situation,” citing studies suggesting that certain types of men are 
highly resistant to persuasion—for example, men classified as “mas-
culine males” in “traditional” sex roles and persons classified as 
“cynically hostile” (of which more than 80% were men).173 
3.   Social Science Research on Gender Differences in Morality 
 Researchers have suggested that women show more “ethical sen-
sitivity”174 and are more religious175 than men. Nonetheless, empirical 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Adrianne W. Kunkel & Brant R. Burleson, Social Support and the Emotional 
Lives of Men and Women: An Assessment of the Different Cultures Perspective, in SEX 
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 110-11. 
 169. Id. at 112. 
 170. Id. at 113-14. But see MARK H. DAVIS, EMPATHY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 58-61 (John Harvey ed., 1996) (stating that studies of gender differences in 
showing empathy are inconclusive; women surpass men on self-reported measures of em-
pathy, but women do not experience greater physiological response to emotional stimuli 
than men). 
 171. See Hall, supra note 162, at 157-58. 
 172. Anthony Mulac, The Gender-Linked Language Effect: Do Language Differences 
Really Make a Difference?, in SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 142. 
 173. Burgoon & Klingle, supra note 105, at 274-75. 
 174. Muriel J. Bebeau & Mary Brabeck, Ethical Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning 
Among Men and Women in the Professions, in WHO CARES?: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ETHIC OF CARE 144, 155-56 (Mary M. Brabeck ed., 
1989). 
 175. See, e.g., David de Vaus & Ian McAllister, Gender Differences in Religion: A Test of 
the Structural Location Theory, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 472, 472 (1987). 
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studies of business persons and business students are inconclusive in 
detecting any significant difference in the ethical judgment176 or “Ma-
chiavellianism”177 of men and women. But most studies of ethical be-
havior or “Machiavellianism” in business settings have relied on par-
ticipants’ responses to hypothetical situations or questions,178 not 
their actual behavior at work.179 
                                                                                                                      
 176. Compare Jeaneen M. Kidwell et al., Differences in Ethical Perceptions Between 
Male and Female Managers: Myth or Reality?, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 489 (1987), Robin R. Rad-
tke, The Effects of Gender and Setting on Accountants’ Ethically Sensitive Decisions, 24 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 299 (2000) (finding no significant gender differences between female and male 
accountants in responses to situations involving ethically sensitive decisions), Robertson & 
Anderson, supra note 134, at 637 (finding gender is not a significant predictor of ethical 
behavior among industrial salespeople and managers), Marshall Schminke, Gender Differ-
ences in Ethical Frameworks and Evaluation of Others’ Choices in Ethical Dilemmas, 16 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 55, 63 (1997) (finding no difference in the “ethical models to which [men and 
women] personally subscribed,” but finding that women were harsher on other women, and 
men were harsher on other men, in evaluating others who displayed unethical judgments), 
and James Weber, Influences Upon Organizational Ethical Subclimates: A Multi-
Departmental Analysis of a Single Firm, 6 ORG. SCI. 509, 522 (1995) (finding no significant 
gender difference in ethical decision-making), with Barnett & Karson, supra note 134, at 
759, Michael Betz et al., Gender Differences in Proclivity for Unethical Behavior, 8 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 321, 324 (1989) (finding that “[m]ale [students] were more than twice as likely to 
say they would engage in” unethical behavior, such as padding travel expenses or embez-
zling), Susan C. Borkowski & Yusuf J. Ugras, Business Students and Ethics: A Meta-
Analysis, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1117, 1124 (1998) (concluding after a meta-analysis of forty-
seven studies that “the null hypothesis of no relationship between gender and ethical be-
havior can be rejected,” and that twenty-nine studies reported that females exhibited more 
ethical attitudes or behavior than males), Gail Eynon et al., Factors that Influence the 
Moral Reasoning Abilities of Accountants: Implications for Universities and the Profession, 
16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1297, 1303 (1997) (finding that “gender has a powerful impact” on the 
moral reasoning abilities of accountants), Libby & Agnello, supra note 134, at 230-31, 
Ruegger & King, supra note 134, at 181-82 (survey of 2196 students taking business 
courses found women significantly “more ethical” than men in responding to six out of ten 
hypothetical ethical business dilemmas), and Jon M. Shepard & Linda S. Hartenian, Ego-
istic and Ethical Orientations of University Students Toward Work-Related Decisions, 10 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 303, 308-09 (1990) (finding that women showed significantly more ethical ori-
entations toward work-related decisions than men in three of four vignettes). 
 177. There is extensive literature in psychology, evolutionary biology, and other disci-
plines on “Machiavellian intelligence,” or “the idea that intelligence began in social ma-
nipulation, deceit and cunning.” Richard W. Byrne & Andrew Whiten, Machiavellian Intel-
ligence, in MACHIAVELLIAN INTELLIGENCE II: EXTENSIONS AND EVALUATIONS 1 (Andrew 
Whiten & Richard W. Byrne eds., 1997). Psychologists have designed so-called “Mach 
tests” that score test-takers as “high-Machs” or “low-Machs” on the basis of their agree-
ment with statements such as “The best way to handle people is to tell them what they 
want to hear.” See RICHARD CHRISTIE & FLORENCE L. GEIS, STUDIES IN MACHIAVELLIANISM 
22 (Leon Festinger & Stanley Schachter eds., 1970). One recent review of the literature as-
serts that although “[g]enerally, the distributions of Mach scores for male and female par-
ticipants are broadly overlapping with the mean slightly lower for female participants,” ex-
ceptions have been found in studies of business executives, which “show either no gender 
difference or a reverse difference in average Mach score (i.e., women score higher than 
men).” David Sloan Wilson et al., Machiavelliansim: A Synthesis of the Evolutionary and 
Psychological Literatures, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 285, 293-94 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 178. For example, many studies use the “Defining Issues Test” (DIT), developed by 
James Rest using Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. See infra note 180; 
JAMES REST, DEVELOPMENT IN JUDGING MORAL ISSUES (1979). The DIT poses three or six 
moral dilemmas to subjects to measure moral reasoning ability. See, e.g., Eynon et al., su-
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 Carol Gilligan, in her seminal work In a Different Voice, posited a 
gendered difference in conceptions of morality, with men generally 
following a “morality of rights” and women generally following a 
“morality of responsibility.”180 The concepts are also called “an ethic 
of justice” and an “ethic of care.”181 The “morality of rights” empha-
sizes “separation rather than connection,” considering “the individual 
rather than the relationship as primary.”182 In addressing hypotheti-
cal situations of moral ambiguity, or in defining morality, male re-
spondents tended to employ a hierarchy of rules emphasizing indi-
vidual rights, while female respondents considered how the outcome 
would affect the existing relationships involved in the situation.183 
                                                                                                                      
pra note 176, at 1297; Richard D. White Jr., Are Women More Ethical? Recent Findings on 
the Effects of Gender Upon Moral Development, 9 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 459, 467 
(1999) (finding that female Coast Guard personnel score significantly higher on the DIT 
than Coast Guard men). 
 179. Borkowski & Ugras, supra note 176, at 1124 (“Reacting more ethically to fictional 
dilemmas does not necessarily translate to more ethical behavior when confronted by real-
world situations.”); see also RHODE, supra note 33, at 30 (“Women who have achieved deci-
sion-making positions in traditionally male-dominated professions generally have been so-
cialized to follow prevailing practices.”); Libby & Agnello, supra note 134, at 232 (“Since 
this research was done in a classroom setting, some of the students may have been giving 
the answers that they felt were expected rather than the ones that they really believed.”). 
 180. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT 22 (1993). This book is critical of Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral de-
velopment. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL 
STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981). Kohlberg developed a six-stage theory of the de-
velopment of moral judgment based on his empirical study of eighty-four boys. As Gilligan 
noted: “Prominent among those who . . . appear to be deficient in moral development when 
measured by Kohlberg’s scale are women, whose judgments seem to exemplify the third 
stage of his six-stage sequence. At this stage morality is conceived in interpersonal terms 
and goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others.” GILLIGAN, supra. In a Different 
Voice has spawned an enormous amount of literature, including further work by Gilligan 
herself. E.g., Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations: Gender Differences 
and Similarities, 34 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 223 (1988). For a small sampling of the discus-
sion and sources, see EVA FEDER KITTAY & DIANA T. MEYERS, WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 
(1987); Owen Flanagan & Kathryn Jackson, Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-
Gilligan Debate Revisited, 97 ETHICS 622 (1987); Sara Jaffee & Janet Shibley Hyde, Gen-
der Differences in Moral Orientation: A Meta-Analysis, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 703 (2000) (an 
overview of empirical research designed to test or quantify Gilligan’s theory); Carrie Men-
kel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 75, 76-77 & nn.8-9 (1994). 
 181.  E.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 180, at 19; Robbin Derry, An Empirical Study of Moral 
Reasoning Among Managers, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 855 (1989). In a different expression, stereo-
typical male qualities are “agentic” (self-asserting and independent from other people) and 
stereotypical female qualities are “communal” (“nurturing, affectionate, helpful, and emo-
tionally expressive”). A. Elizabeth Lindsey & Walter R. Zakahi, Perceptions of Men and 
Women Departing from Conversational Sex Role Stereotypes During Initial Interaction, in 
SEX DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, supra note 4, at 394-95. 
 182. GILLIGAN, supra note 180, at 19. 
 183. E.g., id. at 25-38, 98-100; cf. James R. Harris, Ethical Values and Decision Proc-
esses of Male and Female Business Students, J. EDUC. FOR BUS., Feb. 1989, at 234, 236 
(stating that while finding no significant gender differences in ethical values generally of 
senior business students, highly significant gender differences in the approach to making 
ethical judgments existed; in evaluating outcomes of ethical decisions, males most often 
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 A “morality of rights” does not necessarily dictate adherence to 
positive law. For example, presented with the so-called “Heinz di-
lemma”—whether, to save his wife’s life, a man should steal a drug 
he cannot afford—a male respondent, using a hierarchy of life-over-
property, said the man should steal.184 Similarly, an “ethic of care” 
does not imply a disregard of legal rules. Pondering the same “Heinz 
dilemma,” a female respondent searched for alternative solutions 
that would prevent the theft, reasoning that the wife would be even 
worse off if her husband were put in jail.185 In another example, a fe-
male lawyer recounted a dilemma in which opposing counsel over-
looked a document that would have helped his client. Although torn 
by “concern for the person on the other side,” the female lawyer chose 
“to adhere to the system” and say nothing.186 
 While the terms “ethic of justice” and “ethic of care” defy precise 
definition or measurement, Professor Gilligan’s theory continues to 
hold the attention of scholars in many disciplines. A variety of in-
struments have been devised to measure subjects’ “care” and “justice” 
orientations.187 It should be noted, however, that many studies have 
found that females score higher than males, or at least not lower 
than males, in moral reasoning tests using Kohlberg-type assess-
ment,188 which Gilligan criticizes as ignoring care considerations.189 
 A recent meta-analysis of 113 quantitative studies of moral rea-
soning found a small difference in “care” reasoning favoring females 
and a small difference in “justice” reasoning favoring males, but that 
“73% of the studies that measured care reasoning and 72% of the 
studies that measured justice reasoning failed to find significant 
gender differences.”190 These findings led the researchers “to conclude 
that, although distinct moral orientations may exist, these orienta-
                                                                                                                      
used an egoist-based, or self-centered, approach, while most females used a utilitarian ap-
proach that focused more on a societal view). 
 184. GILLIGAN, supra note 180, at 25-26. 
 185. Id. at 27-28. 
 186. Id. at 135-36. 
 187. E.g., Linda S. Gump et al., Cultural and Gender Differences in Moral Judgment: A 
Study of Mexican Americans and Anglo-Americans, 22 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 78 (2000) (au-
thor designed “Moral Justification Scale” consisting of six dilemmas; females scored sig-
nificantly higher than males on the “Care” scale and lower than males on the “Justice” 
scale). 
 188. See, e.g., Bebeau & Brabeck, supra note 174, at 146 (“To date, the literature exam-
ining gender differences in moral reasoning as defined by Kohlberg’s theory do not support 
Gilligan’s claim.”); Sue J. M. Freeman & John W. Giebink, Moral Judgment as a Function 
of Age, Sex, and Stimulus, 102 J. PSYCHOL. 43, 46 (1979) (finding that 14-year-old girls 
scored significantly higher than 14-year-old boys on Kohlberg-based moral judgment test, 
although differences were not significant at ages 11 or 17); White Jr., supra note 178, at 
467 (finding that female Coast Guard personnel score significantly higher on the Defining 
Issues Test than Coast Guard men). 
 189. GILLIGAN, supra note 180, at 18-22. 
 190. Jaffee & Hyde, supra note 180, at 719. 
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tions are not strongly associated with gender.”191 However, the au-
thors found that the gender difference for both care and justice rea-
soning was greater for “self-generated dilemmas” than for “dilemmas 
in which the content was standardized.”192 The authors believe that 
“[t]his finding provides strong support for studies that have found 
that gender differences in moral orientation are a function of the 
situation to which individuals are responding.”193 
 That conclusion is borne out by studies finding that professional 
women use a “justice” rather than a “care” orientation in moral rea-
soning, suggesting that in the corporate context there is no correla-
tion between gender and the two modes of moral reasoning.194 It is 
not clear from the studies, however, whether the female managers 
are more justice-oriented than women generally (by selection or self-
selection) or whether female managers tend toward a care orienta-
tion, but “have learned to [use] the [justice] reasoning dominant to 
the organization.”195  
4. How Do These Supposed Gender Differences Apply to Attorneys? 
 Several legal commentators have attempted to adapt Professor 
Gilligan’s construct of two distinct moral orientations to attorneys.196 
For example, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that female 
                                                                                                                      
 191. Id. But see Lawrence S. Silver & Sean R. Valentine, College Students’ Perceptions 
of Moral Intensity in Sales Situations, 75 J. OF EDUC. FOR BUS. 309, 312 (2000) (study of 
college students finding women “more ethically oriented than men”). 
 192. Jaffee & Hyde, supra note 180, at 720. 
 193. Id. (citation omitted); see also James J. Hoffman, Are Women Really More Ethical 
than Men? Maybe It Depends on the Situation, 10 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 60, 67 (1998) 
(finding significant gender differences in most but not all ethical vignettes). 
 194. Derry, supra note 181, at 857. Twenty male and twenty female managers in a 
Fortune 100 industrial corporation were asked to describe and evaluate an actual moral 
conflict faced at work and how it was resolved. All but one used primarily “justice” rather 
than “care” reasoning, leading the author to conclude that “[t]here were no significant sta-
tistical correlations between gender and the reported experience of moral conflict, or be-
tween gender and the strength of the justice orientation.” Id.; see also James Weber & 
David Wasieleski, Investigating Influences on Managers’ Moral Reasoning, 40 BUS. & 
SOC’Y 79, 96 (2001) (“[G]ender is not a significant factor influencing managers’ moral rea-
soning in our sample . . . .”) 
 195. Derry, supra note 181, at 859. 
 196. It should be noted that the idea that women are somehow more good and virtuous 
than men is not without its share of feminist detractors and harkens back to the suffra-
gists’ claim that including women in public life “would . . . purify politics.” DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 14 (1989) (citations 
omitted); see MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES 149 (1994) (“I 
do not think that women should accept the role sometimes thrust on them of natural carri-
ers of a morally superior approach to professional life.”). While some feminists have argued 
that the influx of women into the legal profession is beneficial precisely because of their 
different perspective, others believe that a focus on gender differences only perpetuates 
inequality. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculation on a 
Women’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 39 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, 
supra note 180, at 86-87, 111-12 (citations omitted); JACK & JACK, supra note 3, at 154. 
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lawyers might “be more sensitive to clients’ needs and interests, as 
well as to the needs and interests of those who are in relation to each 
other, for example, clients’ families, or employees.”197 Such sensitivity 
would eschew, at a minimum, violations of professional ethics codes 
that would harm clients or others. 
 One study of the class of 1992 at Temple University School of Law 
was designed to explore whether male law students exhibited more 
“rights-oriented moral reasoning” and female law students exhibited 
more “care-oriented moral reasoning.”198 The study found that at the 
beginning of the first year of law school, female law students engaged 
in significantly more “care-oriented moral reasoning” and male law 
students engaged in significantly more “rights-oriented moral rea-
soning.”199 Interestingly, however, by the end of the first year of law 
school, the female law students’ “care orientation” had declined and 
“rights orientation” had increased so that “there was no significant 
difference in the care orientations” and rights orientations of male 
and female law students.200 Thus, according to this study, the greater 
female “ethic of care” had evaporated by the end of the first year of 
law school.201 
 In interviews of over 100 female lawyers, mostly graduates of 
Harvard Law School, between 1989 and 1991, Mona Harrington 
found that many interviewees ascribed an “ethic of competition” to 
the still male-dominated legal culture, especially in litigation, where 
the adversarial system compels lawyers, “[l]ike football players or 
armed warriors, . . . to compete with the serious aim of defeating the 
opposing side.”202 She concluded that in general, female attorneys 
subscribe more to an “ethic of care” and “tend to shy away from the 
most adversarial arenas in the law and to gravitate toward those 
                                                                                                                      
 197. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 180, at 86-87 (citations omitted). 
 198. Janoff, supra note 3, at 193. “The study assumed that care and rights thinking are 
not mutually exclusive perspectives.” Id. at 226. 
 199. Id. at 217-26. 
 200. Id. at 229-33. 
 201. While it is possible that “rights-reasoning women may be the women most likely 
to attend law school,” that would not explain the Temple University study’s finding of a 
gender difference in moral reasoning before the students began their law school careers.  
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 180, at 80 n.25; cf. Andrea Kayne Kaufman, The Logician 
Versus the Linguist—An Empirical Tale of Functional Discrimination in the Legal Acad-
emy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 247, 266 (2002) (suggesting that a traditional law school edu-
cation alienates female law students because it emphasizes “logical intelligence” to the det-
riment of “concerns of empathy, relational logic, social context, plurality of interests and 
circumstantial justifications”). 
 202. HARRINGTON, supra note 196, at 10-11, 128-33; see also Jeffreys, supra note 20, at 
33 (Commenting on the gender gap in attorney discipline in Texas, Larry Doherty, a Texas 
lawyer, “suggests that women lawyers simply tend to be more ethical because they don’t 
have ‘warlike, overbearing and unresponsive’ instincts.”). 
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forms of practice that are most consultative and conciliatory . . . such 
as securities, antitrust, bankruptcy, and tax.”203  
 But even if this is true, an “ethic of competition” is not equivalent 
to an ethic that is more likely to violate disciplinary rules.204 And in 
our database, looking solely at the violation category of “Improper 
Litigation Conduct,” contrary to what one might expect from an over-
charged male “ethic of competition,” there were five more actual 
cases of women in this category than would be predicted based upon 
the proportion of women in the population of disciplined attorneys, 
although the difference was not statistically significant.205  
 If it is true that women are better listeners, better communica-
tors, more understanding of nonverbal cues, more concerned about 
maintaining relationships, smile more, and are just all-around more 
“caring” than men, then it would not be startling to discover that fe-
male attorneys’ clients are more satisfied than male attorneys’ cli-
ents. Clients’ most common complaints to disciplinary agencies in-
volve the attorney’s failure to communicate in some fashion, such as 
by failing to return phone calls, or failure to take care of the client, 
such as by neglecting a legal matter or handling it incompetently.206 
We can therefore hypothesize that female attorneys communicate 
with and take care of their clients better than male attorneys, thus 
generating fewer disciplinary grievances.  
 Our study cannot support or reject this hypothesis. One could ar-
gue that women’s alleged better communication skills and greater 
level of caring are what contribute to the gender difference in disci-
pline overall. But the data from the study, which include only disci-
                                                                                                                      
 203. HARRINGTON, supra note 196, at 129, 150. But see Catherine M. Lee et al., Attor-
neys’ Opinions Regarding Child Custody Mediation and Assessment Services: The Influence 
of Gender, Years of Experience, and Mediation Practice, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 
216, 223-24 (1998) (finding no support for “[t]he hypothesis that female lawyers would be 
more favorably disposed to mediation than” male lawyers). 
 204. But see HARRINGTON, supra note 196, at 148-50 (linking competitive pressures on 
big law firms in the 1980s to excesses leading to huge fines paid by two large law firms to 
the federal government for their alleged “complicity in the illegal activities of [their] client 
Charles Keating, Jr.”). 
 205. See supra tbl.8, at p. 813. 
 206. See supra tbl.7, at p. 811 (revealing violations involving competence or diligence 
comprised the largest percentage (17%) of all violations in the database, and violations in-
volving communications with clients comprised the second largest percentage (14%) of all 
violations in the database); see also, e.g., VA. STATE BAR, 62ND ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, 
at 10 (2001), available at http://www.vsb.org; VA. STATE BAR, 63RD ANNUAL REPORT 2000-
2001 at 11 (2002), available at http://www.vsb.org; Letter from Norman G. Bastemeyer, 
Iowa Supreme Court, Ethics Administrator, Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, to 
Honorable Arthur A. McGiverin, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Iowa (June 30, 2000) (on 
file with authors) (“The ethical violation most often alleged was neglect or incompetence 
(278) [of 488 complaints], followed by fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation (79) 
and conflict of interest (60).”); see also Levin, supra note 15, at 26 & n.121 (citing addi-
tional sources). 
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plined attorneys, have nothing directly to say about women attor-
neys’ communication skills generally. 
 Further, disciplined female attorneys in 2000 committed far fewer 
violations related to competence, diligence, and communication than 
one would expect based on the proportion of women in the entire at-
torney population (23.6%), and the differences are highly significant 
statistically.207 But so are the differences between men and women 
with respect to every kind of violation, not just competence, diligence, 
and communications with clients.  
 Looking at the disciplined attorneys only, and not the entire at-
torney population, the results are surprising. If women were more 
caring and better listeners than men, one might expect to see the in-
cidence of non-diligence and non-communication among female disci-
plined attorneys to be less than their proportion of disciplined attor-
neys. But although women make up 11.7% of the disciplined attor-
neys in our database, women committed 13% of the violations relat-
ing to competence and diligence and 14% of the violations relating to 
communications with clients.208 These differences are statistically 
significant.  
 During a workshop, some of our colleagues suggested a difference 
between “sins of commission” and “sins of omission,” with criminal 
activity, misappropriation, and fraud exemplifying the former, and 
non-diligence and non-communication exemplifying the latter. Male 
attorneys were much more likely to commit “sins of commission,” 
while female attorneys were more likely to commit “sins of omission.” 
A possible reason for this disparity could be female attorneys’ dispro-
portionate burden of housework and child care, leading to severe 
time constraints.209 In addition, female attorneys’ higher incidence of 
depression may account for part of the female disciplined attorneys’ 
unexpectedly high frequency of a sanctionable lack of diligence, com-
petence, or communications with clients.210  
 In an important study designed to test Gilligan’s theory as applied 
to lawyers’ ethical decision-making, authors Rand Jack and Dana 
Crowley Jack interviewed thirty-six lawyers in Washington state, 
                                                                                                                      
 207. See supra tbl.8, at p. 813. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 106, at 228 (stating women’s “primary responsibility 
for childrearing continues to disadvantage them within the most competitive legal ca-
reers”); EPSTEIN, supra note 150 at 329-79; Sagrestano et al., supra note 159, at 295; ARLIE 
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT 3-4, 6-10 (Penguin Books 
2003) (1989); David L. Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Law-
yers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 251 (1989). 
 210. See supra tbl.8, at p. 813; Benjamin et al., supra note 138, at 244 (noting “neglect 
cases tend to arise among lawyers who are procrastinating because they are clinically de-
pressed”). 
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matched by age and gender.211 The interviews had three parts. First, 
the attorneys indicated their general moral orientation in response to 
questions such as, “What does morality mean to you?” and “What 
makes something a moral problem or dilemma for you?”212 In this 
part of the interview, where participants were least bound by their 
professional role as attorneys, 77% of the men and 36% of the women 
had a “rights” orientation, while 64% of the women and 23% of the 
men had a “care” orientation.213 Second, the attorneys were asked to 
describe moral dilemmas they had faced in the practice of law and 
how they had handled them.214 Of the thirty attorneys who identified 
such dilemmas, 77% of the men and 41% of the women had a “rights” 
orientation, while 59% of the women and 23% of the men had a “care” 
orientation.215  
 Finally, the attorneys in the Jacks’ study were asked how they 
would respond to two hypothetical moral dilemmas. In the first, the 
legal rules governing the attorney’s conduct were clear despite any 
contrary moral pull.216 In the second, the governing legal rules were 
fuzzier, leaving more room for the expression of any countervailing 
personal morality.217 Women were more likely to express a “care” ori-
entation than a “rights” orientation in response to the second hypo-
thetical, when the professional rules were unclear.218 In response to 
the first hypothetical, when the professional rules were clear, both 
male and female lawyers responded with a “justice” or “rights” ap-
proach.219 Thus, Professor Menkel-Meadow commented on the Jacks’ 
research that “the professional role, legal education, and an under-
                                                                                                                      
 211. JACK & JACK, supra note 3, at xi-xii. For another summary of the Jacks’ research, 
see Judith Leonie Miller, Making Change: Women and Ethics in the Practice of Law, 2 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 453 (1990). 
 212. JACK & JACK, supra note 3, at 56. 
 213. Id. at 188. 
 214. Id. at 65. 
 215. Id. at 189. 
 216. The first hypothetical postulated that the attorney represented a criminal defen-
dant who had confessed to a murder. Although the attorney has no doubt that the defen-
dant had committed the murder and continues to be dangerous, the attorney is also sure 
that he or she can have the confession excluded. The moral dilemma pitted the attorney’s 
obligation to suppress the confession against his or her concern for public safety if the cli-
ent is released. Id. at 72-75. 
 217. The second hypothetical postulated that the attorney, representing a parent in a 
child custody proceeding, finds a letter containing information that makes the attorney be-
lieve the opposing parent would clearly be the better parent. The hypothetical was changed 
midway through the discussion to add that the letter threatened serious bodily harm to the 
children. Id. at 78-80. 
 218. Id. at 55, 80-81. In response to the second hypothetical, 76% of the men and 50% 
of the women had a “rights” orientation, while 50% of the women and 24% of the men had 
a “care” orientation. Id. at 190. 
 219. Id. at 75. In response to the first hypothetical, 84% of the men and 72% of the 
women had a “rights” orientation, while 28% of the women and 16% of the men had a 
“care” orientation. Id. at 190. The difference was not statistically significant. 
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standing of the norms of the profession could often, if not always, 
trump gender patterns in moral reasoning.”220  
 Does the Jacks’ study offer any insight into the gender difference 
we found in attorney discipline rates? Perhaps not. The most com-
mon disciplinary violations do not involve any morally ambiguous 
“dilemma” that can be framed in terms of harm to client versus harm 
to others. Most disciplined attorneys in 2000 broke ethical rules that 
caused harm to their clients and some type of benefit to, or some in-
dulgence of, themselves. A lawyer should not steal a client’s money. 
A lawyer should not commit a felony. A lawyer should not allow the 
statute of limitations to run on a client’s meritorious claim. A lawyer 
should not fail to return a client’s repeated phone calls. One must 
strain to imagine how a “care orientation” could lead to a different 
outcome than a “rights orientation” in these situations. The ethical 
violations that a lawyer is most likely to be disciplined for do not lend 
themselves to struggles between a “care orientation” and a “rights 
orientation.” Violation of these rules offends both.221  
 The Jacks’ study suggests that when professional rules are clear-
cut, male and female lawyers exhibit similar dominant levels of 
“rights” reasoning—not that female lawyers will follow those rules 
more frequently than male lawyers. To account for the latter, one is 
thrown back upon speculation. If the imperative of the “care” per-
spective is to avoid harm and preserve relationships,222 perhaps it is 
female lawyers’ greater “care” orientation that leads them to obey 
ethical rules with greater fervor, because violation of these rules is 
likely to cause harm to their clients or others.  
5.   Factors Not Accounted for 
 Although our study shows a significant gender disparity in rates 
of discipline, it must be remembered that attorney disciplinary pro-
ceedings as a whole involve a very small percentage of active attor-
neys, male or female. According to ABA figures, less than 0.6% of ac-
tive lawyers in 1999 received a disciplinary sanction.223 A greater 
                                                                                                                      
 220. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 180, at 96. 
 221. But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 180, at 93 (suggesting that the adoption of 
ethics codes such as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is itself an example of the 
“ethic of justice”). 
 222. JACK & JACK, supra note 3, at 6. 
 223. 1998-99 SURVEY, supra note 16, at 33, 37. In forty-six reporting jurisdictions, 
there were 2643 private sanctions, 3906 public sanctions, and 1,147,125 lawyers with ac-
tive licenses in 1999. The reason this figure is larger than the 0.3% of lawyers disciplined 
reported, supra note 85, is that it includes private sanctions as well as public sanctions. 
For the most part, our database did not include private sanctions, because by definition, 
they are usually not publicly available, and even if reported in some manner, it is usually 
without the attorney’s name, making it impossible to determine the attorney’s sex. The 
0.6% of all lawyers who were disciplined in 1999 is nonetheless, a larger percentage than 
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percentage of lawyers—over 10%—is the subject of a complaint re-
ceived by a disciplinary agency,224 but most complaints are dismissed 
without the filing of formal charges.225 This suggests that the vast 
majority of male and female attorneys similarly adhere to the rules 
of professional conduct,226 or that grievances against attorneys in 
general are greatly underreported and underinvestigated,227 or both.  
 Some social science researchers have concluded that the percent-
age of variance in behavior that can be accounted for or explained by 
knowledge of a person’s sex is generally less than 10%; other factors 
account for the lion’s share of the explanation.228 There are numerous 
factors that may contribute to an attorney’s commission of discipli-
nary infractions that the publicly-available reports of disciplinary ac-
tion did not contain: for example, the law school the attorney at-
tended,229 the attorney’s class rank in that law school (or even the 
grade received in Professional Responsibility), the attorney’s score on 
                                                                                                                      
in earlier decades. See, e.g., Garbus & Seligman, supra note 117, at 48 (approximately 0.1% 
of practicing lawyers were disciplined in 1972). 
 224. 1998-99 SURVEY, supra note 16, at 33 (showing in forty-six reporting jurisdictions, 
there were 116,922 complaints to disciplinary agencies equaling 10.2% of the 1,147,125 
lawyers with active licenses in 1999). 
 225. Id. (stating that although 116,922 disciplinary complaints were filed in 1999, only 
3717 lawyers were formally charged); see also ABEL, supra note 106, at 145 (“Starting from 
a population of complaints that already overlooks most misconduct, the disciplinary proc-
ess then displays extraordinary lenience.”); Levin, supra note 15, at 8-9 (“[O]nly about five 
percent of all complaints [about attorneys] result in any sanctions.”). 
 226. See RHODE, supra note 33, at 9, 30 (stating “psychological research finds few re-
spects in which men and women consistently differ, and even for those characteristics, 
gender typically accounts for only a small part of the variation among individuals”); Aries, 
supra note 156, at 67 (“We have tended to overlook the considerable overlap between the 
behavior of men and women and to misrepresent small differences as mutually exclu-
sive.”). In one study of moral reasoning ability, advanced law students scored much higher 
than average adults in general. In the groups studied, advanced law students ranked be-
hind only moral philosophy and political science doctoral students and seminarians in a 
liberal Protestant seminary. See JAMES REST, DIT MANUAL (1990). 
 227. See, e.g., Guttenberg, supra note 10, at 964 (suggesting the relatively small per-
centage of attorneys in Ohio who are actually disciplined is a function of lack of enforce-
ment, not lack of ethical transgressions); Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When No-
body’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Profes-
sional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971 (2002) (showing the author’s study of lawyer advertising 
in the San Diego Yellow Pages revealed far more violations of advertising rules than re-
ported disciplinary cases involving advertising). As discussed earlier, it is possible that un-
derenforcement is even more pronounced for women, but there is very little data bearing 
on this question. 
 228. See Aries, supra note 156, at 67-69 (citing numerous studies). 
 229. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 137, at 884 n.62 (“[T]he better one’s law school, the 
better one’s chance of avoiding discipline.”) (citing Nancy McCarthy, Legal Ethics: Just 
Who Is Responsible?, CAL. B.J., Oct. 1995, at 27). But see Ramos, supra note 112, at 32-38 
(Showing a study of legal malpractice claims in Florida from 1988-1994 that concludes 
“[t]he percentage of legal malpractice claims by law school simply mirrors the general per-
centage of lawyers who graduated from those law schools.” In other words, graduates of the 
“worst” law schools are not disproportionately responsible for generating more malpractice 
claims.). 
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the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, or the size of the 
attorney’s firm. The reader can undoubtedly imagine several other 
factors. 
 Further, although we used our best efforts, it is more than possi-
ble that our database is missing cases decided in 2000. In particular, 
we were concerned that the ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline Sys-
tems for the year 1999 reported 3906 public sanctions—even with the 
data from six small-population states missing.230 The 3575 cases we 
were able to locate for 2000 may represent a miraculous drop in dis-
ciplinary actions in the new millennium231 or illustrate what one 
scholar termed “[i]nadequate record-keeping by many jurisdictions, 
differing reporting methods, [and] uninformative published opin-
ions.”232 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Our study found—consistently with the Oklahoma state report 
that led us down this path—that female attorneys are disciplined at 
a much lower rate than male attorneys nationally. Further, even the 
female attorneys that are disciplined incur generally less severe 
sanctions than disciplined male attorneys. However, we found that 
an attorney’s gender does not significantly affect the length of a term 
suspension, suggesting that factors other than gender may influence 
the severity of a sanction.  
 None of the possible reasons we considered for the large overall 
difference in disciplinary rates between men and women provide an 
entirely satisfactory explanation. First, we are not aware of anything 
that would make the year 2000 different from other years in the re-
cent past, and indeed an unscientific sampling of other years in se-
lected states shows much the same gender pattern.  
 Second, the results of the regressions—that gender is not a sig-
nificant predictor of the length of term suspensions—tend to suggest 
that disciplinary boards are not “soft” on women. It is possible, 
though, that disciplinary boards do not initiate formal charges 
against women at the same rate as against men, as some limited in-
formation from Illinois suggests, but there is little other publicly 
available information with which we might further explore this hy-
pothesis.  
 Third, our study was not designed to determine the proportions of 
male and female attorneys in certain practice areas, such as domestic 
                                                                                                                      
 230. 1998-99 SURVEY, supra note 16, at 37. 
 231. The ABA’s own figures do show an 8% drop of 542 disciplinary sanctions from 
1998 to 1999. 1998-99 SURVEY, supra note 16, at 8, 37 (indicating a decrease from 7091 
public and private sanctions in 1998 to 6549 public and private sanctions in 1999). 
 232. Levin, supra note 15, at 6 (citations omitted). 
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relations, or certain types of firms, such as a solo practice. Nor was 
our study designed to determine whether attorneys in certain prac-
tice areas incur disciplinary sanctions at a higher-than-average rate 
relative to their proportion in the attorney population. Our much 
more limited findings on the most common types of legal matters to 
generate disciplinary sanctions suggest that whatever gender differ-
ences there might be in individual areas roughly cancel each other 
out. In particular, although a higher percentage of the legal matters 
handled by disciplined men involved criminal law and personal in-
jury, a higher percentage of the legal matters handled by disciplined 
women involved domestic relations. 
 Fourth, although we do not know why, the median age of disci-
plined attorneys (both male and female) is much higher than the me-
dian age of lawyers generally. The fact that female attorneys are 
younger, on average, than male attorneys probably contributes to the 
overall difference in disciplinary rates between men and women. But 
age does not appear to significantly influence the length of a term 
suspension, suggesting that women’s relative youthfulness might not 
explain why men suffer severe sanctions at a higher rate than 
women.  
 Fifth, gender differences in substance abuse and emotional prob-
lems could theoretically contribute to differences in disciplinary 
rates. But our data, published reports of disciplinary actions, did not 
contain enough information to evaluate this hypothesis. 
 Sixth, although female attorneys may be somewhat less motivated 
by money than male attorneys, the connection between financial mo-
tivation and disciplinary violations is murky. On the one hand, fi-
nancial gain is likely to motivate the misappropriation of funds as 
well as the charging of excessive fees. Male attorneys misappropriate 
client funds and violate fees rules at a higher rate than female attor-
neys. On the other hand, some of the most common disciplinary vio-
lations, including incompetence, lack of diligence, and improper 
communications with clients, do not appear to be motivated by finan-
cial gain.  
 Seventh, women may still believe they are subject to discrimina-
tion. However, our study was not designed to test how this attitude 
might contribute to a lower discipline rate, and the data is not infor-
mative. 
 Finally, research in other disciplines suggests biological and social 
gender differences, such as women’s better communication skills, 
that might lead clients to be more satisfied, or at least less aggra-
vated, with female attorneys. Again, our study could not measure 
these traits. In addition, a large body of scholarship on a postulated 
gender difference in morality between a “rights” and a “care” orienta-
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tion yields inconclusive results. In any event, the “rights”/“care” di-
chotomy does not appear particularly relevant in the context of at-
torney discipline, because violation of most disciplinary rules clearly 
offends both a “rights” and a “care” orientation.  
 To our knowledge, this is the first published national study of 
gender differences in attorney discipline.233 At a minimum, we hope 
that it makes a useful contribution to the slim volume of empirical 
work on attorney discipline and suggests areas for further re-
search.234  
TABLE 18 
State-by-State Comparison of Genders of All Attorneys+  
and Genders of Disciplined Attorneys++ 
State No. of 
Licensed 
Attor-
neys 
  
% (no.) 
Male 
Attor-
neys 
% (no.) 
Female 
Attor-
neys 
No. of 
Attor-
neys 
Disci-
plined 
in 2000 
% (no.) 
of Male 
Disci-
plined 
Attor-
neys† 
% (no.) of 
Female 
Disci-
plined At-
torneys† 
Ala-
bama** 
8,838 82.6% 
(7,300) 
17.4% 
(1,538) 
47 93.6% 
(44) 
6.4% 
(3) 
Alaska** 
  
2,219 74.2% 
(1,647)  
25.8% 
(572) 
14 92.9% 
(13) 
0% 
(0) 
Arizona** 10,685 77.2% 
(8,249) 
22.8% 
(2,436) 
71 90.1% 
(64) 
9.9% 
(7) 
Arkansas 4,414 82.9% 
(3,660) 
17.1% 
(754) 
84 89.3% 
(75) 
10.7% 
(9) 
Califor-
nia** 
113,173 73.6% 
(83,286) 
26.4% 
(29,887) 
449 84.2% 
(378) 
15.1% 
(68) 
Colorado 14,603 75.1% 
(10,971) 
24.9% 
(3,632) 
43 83.7% 
(36) 
14% 
(6) 
Connecti-
cut** 
15,093 75.5% 
(11,394) 
24.5% 
(3,699) 
75 90.7% 
(68) 
6.7% 
(5) 
Delaware 2,358 75.8% 
(1,787) 
24.2% 
(571) 
14 85.7% 
(12) 
14.3% 
(2) 
                                                                                                                      
 233. Cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 180, at 88 (“At present, virtually no studies report 
on how the different genders actually practice law . . . .”). 
 234. See supra note 15. 
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State No. of 
Licensed 
Attor-
neys 
  
% (no.) 
Male 
Attor-
neys 
% (no.) 
Female 
Attor-
neys 
No. of 
Attor-
neys 
Disci-
plined 
in 2000 
% (no.) 
of Male 
Disci-
plined 
Attor-
neys† 
% (no.) of 
Female 
Disci-
plined At-
torneys† 
District of 
Colum-
bia** 
40,357 69% 
(27,849) 
31% 
(12,508) 
116 87.1% 
(101) 
11.2% 
(13) 
Florida** 41,131 78.4% 
(32,251) 
21.6% 
(8,880) 
310 87.7% 
(272) 
11.6% 
(36) 
Georgia** 19,593 77.2% 
(15,121) 
22.8% 
(4,472) 
90 89% 
(80) 
10% 
(9) 
Hawaii 3,679 75.2% 
(2,766) 
24.8% 
(913) 
14 92.9% 
(13) 
7.1% 
(1) 
Idaho 2,707 84.1% 
(2,276) 
15.9% 
(431) 
6 100% 
(6) 
0% 
(0) 
Illinois** 45,810 77.1% 
(35,321) 
22.9% 
(10,489) 
123 92.7% 
(114) 
7.3% 
(9) 
Indiana** 11,677 80.7% 
(9,424) 
19.3% 
(2,253) 
75 92% 
(69) 
8% 
(6) 
Iowa* 6,422 82.8% 
(5,316) 
17.2% 
(1,106) 
44 93.2% 
(41) 
6.8% 
(3) 
Kansas 6,412 81.6% 
(5,233) 
18.4% 
(1,179) 
30 90% 
(27) 
10% 
(3) 
Kentucky 8,533 79.6% 
(6,791) 
20.4% 
(1,742) 
48 77.1% 
(37) 
22.9% 
(11) 
Louisi-
ana** 
13,269 79.7% 
(10,569) 
20.3% 
(2,700) 
80 88.8% 
(71) 
11.2% 
(9) 
Maine 3,312 76.3% 
(2,528) 
23.7% 
(784) 
10 90% 
(9) 
10% 
(1) 
Maryland 17,074 74.3% 
(12,686) 
25.7% 
(4,388) 
84 79.8% 
(67) 
17.9% 
(15) 
Massa-
chusetts** 
28,967 72.9% 
(21,121) 
27.1% 
(7,846) 
126 84.9% 
(107) 
11.9% 
(15) 
Michigan 23,965 80.1% 
(19,186) 
19.9% 
(4,779) 
127 83.5% 
(106) 
16.5% 
(21) 
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State No. of 
Licensed 
Attor-
neys 
  
% (no.) 
Male 
Attor-
neys 
% (no.) 
Female 
Attor-
neys 
No. of 
Attor-
neys 
Disci-
plined 
in 2000 
% (no.) 
of Male 
Disci-
plined 
Attor-
neys† 
% (no.) of 
Female 
Disci-
plined At-
torneys† 
Minne-
sota** 
15,084 76.3% 
(11,511) 
23.7% 
(3,573) 
44 97.7% 
(43) 
2.3% 
(1) 
Missis-
sippi 
5,028 85% 
(4,271) 
15% 
(757) 
28 92.9% 
(26) 
7.1% 
(2) 
Mis-
souri** 
16,065 78.5% 
(12,605) 
21.5% 
(3,460) 
41 92.7% 
(38) 
7.3% 
(3) 
Montana 2,369 81.8% 
(1,939) 
18.2% 
(430) 
13 92.3% 
(12) 
7.7% 
(1) 
Nebraska 4,651 81.2% 
(3,778) 
18.8% 
(873) 
12 75% 
(9) 
25% 
(3) 
Nevada** 3,651 79.8% 
(2,914) 
20.2% 
(737) 
41 68.3% 
(28) 
2.4% 
(1) 
New 
Hamp-
shire 
3,218 75.2% 
(2,420) 
24.8% 
(798) 
2 100% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
New Jer-
sey** 
32,516 75.9% 
(24,691) 
24.1% 
(7,825) 
189 84.7% 
(160) 
13.8% 
(26) 
New Mex-
ico 
4,231 72.6% 
(3,072) 
27.4% 
(1,159) 
4 100% 
(4) 
0% 
(0) 
New 
York** 
97,025 74.4% 
(72,184) 
25.6% 
(24,841) 
237 92.0% 
(218) 
8.0% 
(19) 
North 
Caro-
lina** 
12,894 78.4% 
(10,115) 
21.6% 
(2,779) 
63 88.9% 
(56) 
11.1% 
(7) 
North 
Dakota 
1,388 83.2% 
(1,155) 
16.8% 
(233) 
7 85.7% 
(6) 
14.3% 
(1) 
Ohio** 31,623 80.2% 
(25,359) 
19.8% 
(6,264) 
89 91% 
(81) 
9% 
(8) 
Okla-
homa** 
9,719 80.1% 
(7,785) 
19.9% 
(1,934) 
21 100% 
(21) 
0% 
(0) 
856  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:785 
 
State No. of 
Licensed 
Attor-
neys 
  
% (no.) 
Male 
Attor-
neys 
% (no.) 
Female 
Attor-
neys 
No. of 
Attor-
neys 
Disci-
plined 
in 2000 
% (no.) 
of Male 
Disci-
plined 
Attor-
neys† 
% (no.) of 
Female 
Disci-
plined At-
torneys† 
Oregon 9,181 77.7% 
(7,133) 
22.3% 
(2,048) 
56 83.9% 
(47) 
16.1% 
(9) 
Pennsyl-
vania** 
38,648 75.1% 
(29,042) 
24.9% 
(9,606) 
80 91.2% 
(73) 
8.8% 
(7) 
Rhode Is-
land 
3,194 79.2% 
(2,530) 
20.8% 
(664) 
5 100% 
(5) 
0% 
(0) 
South 
Carolina 
6,685 81% 
(5,416) 
19% 
(1,269) 
57 89.5% 
(51) 
10.5% 
(6) 
South 
Dakota 
1,549 83.3% 
(1,290) 
16.7% 
(259) 
4 100% 
(4) 
0% 
(0) 
Tennes-
see** 
11,371 80.2% 
(9,125) 
19.8% 
(2,246) 
73 90.4% 
(66) 
9.6% 
(7) 
Texas** 52,686 77.6% 
(40,875) 
22.4% 
(11,811) 
230 83.0% 
(191) 
16.5% 
(38) 
Utah 4,456 83.7% 
(3,730) 
16.3% 
(726) 
27 81.5% 
(22) 
18.5% 
(5) 
Vermont 1,935 75.8% 
(1,466) 
24.2% 
(469) 
7 100% 
(7) 
0% 
(0) 
Virginia** 17,781 79% 
(14,045) 
21% 
(3,736) 
64 89.1% 
(57) 
10.9% 
(7) 
Washing-
ton** 
15,928 75.1% 
(11,956) 
24.9% 
(3,972) 
73 86.3% 
(63) 
13.7% 
(10) 
West Vir-
ginia 
3,694 80.1% 
(2,959) 
19.9% 
(735) 
14 85.7% 
(12) 
14.3% 
(2) 
Wisconsin 12,217 80.2% 
(9,793) 
19.8% 
(2,424) 
26 88.5% 
(23) 
11.5% 
(3) 
Wyoming 1,313 82.1% 
(1,078) 
17.9% 
(235) 
2 50% 
(1) 
50% 
(1) 
* The difference between expected and actual proportions of disciplined attor-
neys is statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 90%. 
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** The difference between expected and actual proportions of disciplined attor-
neys is statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 95% (chi square 
test). 
+ Source for the percentages of male and female attorneys by state: CARSON, su-
pra note 28. 
++ Sources for disciplined attorneys on file with authors. 
 
